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A Wall Between a Secular Government 
and a Religious People 
John A. Ragosta* 
INTRODUCTION 
The “wall of separation” between church and state, a phrase 
popularized by Thomas Jefferson and unanimously embraced by 
the Supreme Court in its first religious freedom case, is a useful 
metaphor to describe how, under the Constitution’s proscription of 
religious establishments and protection of the free exercise of 
religion, government must not interfere with the church and the 
church (institutionally) must not interfere with government.1 
* Historian at the Robert H. Smith International Center for Jefferson
Studies at Monticello.  The author would like to thank Carl Bogus and the 
entire staff of Roger Williams University School of Law and the Roger Williams 
University Law Review for their excellent work on the conference (especially 
under the trying circumstances of conducting it virtually) and in preparing this 
important issue of the Law Review.  I would also like to thank the Freedom 
from Religion Foundation and Andrew Seidel for their support of this confer-
ence.  The views expressed herein are the author’s own and do not reflect the 
views of the Thomas Jefferson Foundation nor Virginia Humanities.  Of course, 
any errors are the author’s own. 
1. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).  Others used
the metaphor of a wall of separation before Jefferson.  For example, James 
Burgh, in “Political Disquisitions,” writes of the danger of the church as an 
engine of state and in “Crito” urges the building of an “impenetrable wall of 
separation between things sacred and civil . . . .  The less the church and the 
state had to do with one another, it would be better for both.”  STEVEN K. 
GREEN, INVENTING A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE MYTH OF THE RELIGIOUS
FOUNDING 54 (2015) (quoting BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 35 (1968)).  Roger Williams said much the same, for ex-
ample referring to the “hedge or wall of Separation between the Garden of the 
Church and the Wilderness of the world.”  1 ROGER WILLIAMS,  Mr. Cotton’s 
Letter Examined and Answered, in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER 
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“Jefferson’s metaphor in describing the relation between Church 
and State speaks of a ‘wall of separation,’ not of a fine line easily 
overstepped.”2  Admittedly, James Madison on occasion spoke of a 
“line of separation,” but he meant the same thing.3 
Most Americans agree that the metaphor properly describes 
the appropriate constitutional relationship—sixty-three percent of 
Americans want “churches to stay out of politics.”4  While the wall 
metaphor does not, itself, resolve all of the relevant conflicts and its 
application to particular cases may be complex, Justice Jackson’s 
backhanded reference to the “serpentine walls” at Jefferson’s 
WILLIAMS 315, 392 (Perry Miller ed., 1963).  (It is worth noting that the Found-
ers, lacking the ability to “Google” in robust databases, do not appear to have 
relied on Williams’ writings in their early debates on religious freedom and 
adoption of the First Amendment).  Jefferson’s use of the phrase in his January 
1, 1802, letter to the Danbury Baptists declaring that the First Amendment 
had erected a “wall of separation between Church [and] State,” Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-36-02-0152-0006 
[perma.cc/8K3A-FPXB] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) [hereinafter Letter to the 
Danbury Baptists], undoubtedly popularized the image, and the phrase is com-
monly associated with Jefferson, see, e.g., JOHN RAGOSTA, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: 
JEFFERSON’S LEGACY, AMERICA’S CREED 140–41, 256 n.12 (2013). 
2. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948).
3. See Letter from James Madison to Jasper Adams (Sept. 1833), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/99-02-02-2830 
[perma.cc/7KYX-P863] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).  A few academics have tried 
to make a substantive point out of Jefferson’s use of the “wall” metaphor while 
Madison referred to a “line,” arguing that Madison was less committed to a 
strict separation.  See, e.g., Daniel L. Dreisbach, Introduction to JASPER ADAMS, 
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: JASPER ADAMS AND THE CHURCH 
STATE DEBATE 1, 21 (Daniel L. Dreisbach, ed., 1996); Sydney E. Mead, Neither 
Church nor State: Reflections on James Madison’s ‘Line of Separation,’ 10 J. OF 
CHURCH AND STATE 349, 350 (1968).  This is to grasp at straws and is incon-
sistent with Madison’s views on church-state relations.  That Madison, the con-
summate wordsmith and draftsman, used the two-dimensional analogy of a 
line while Jefferson, an architect and gardener, used the three-dimensional 
analogy of a wall, is simply not substantively significant. 
4. Americans have Positive Views about Religion’s Role in Society, but
Want It Out of Politics, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pew-
forum.org/2019/11/15/americans-have-positive-views-about-religions-role-in-
society-but-want-it-out-of-politics/ [perma.cc/AS9G-XAW6].  Of course, there 
are those who reject the metaphor, noting accurately that the phrase was not 
itself included in the Constitution, while inaccurately dismissing the influence 
of Jefferson and the idea of separation.  See, e.g., DAVID BARTON, THE
JEFFERSON LIES (2012); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91–99 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing adherence to Jefferson’s “wall” meta-
phor). 
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University of Virginia is unkind and tends to unfairly minimize the 
significance of the metaphor.5  The simile is pedagogically powerful, 
and this type of broadly-embraced and easily-understood public 
metaphor helps to embed the principle in the minds of the people. 
In a similar vein, Madison recognized that an important function of 
a bill of rights is that “political truths declared in that solemn 
manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims 
of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the 
national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and 
passion.”6  The powerful ability of a clever simile to explain and to 
be embraced by the people has certainly been the history of the 
“wall of separation.” 
The prominence of Jefferson’s turn of a phrase, though, begs 
the question: Why do we care so much what Jefferson and Madison 
thought about religious freedom?  In fact, a group of historians and 
judges, most notably with the encouragement of Justice Rehnquist 
in Wallace v. Jaffree, have sought to minimize the importance of 
their views.7  After all, critics ask, should we not be equally 
interested in the view of other Founders or those who ratified the 
Constitution, the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment?8  Alexander Hamilton has suddenly become popular, 
for example, and he sponsored a “Christian Constitution Society.”9  
Make no mistake, these attacks on the Jeffersonian influence 
herald an attempt to breach that wall of separation. 
I have addressed this topic in detail elsewhere.10  Suffice it to 
say that not only did Jefferson and Madison provide the intellectual 
and political foundation for the adoption of the Virginia Statute for 
Establishing Religious Freedom, but that statute became central to 
5. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237–38 (1948) (Jackson,
J., concurring). 
6. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-14-02-0018 
[https://perma.cc/LT5Z-4HTL] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
7. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 98–99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Patrick F. Brown, Wallace v. Jaffree and the Need to Reform
Establishment Clause Analysis, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 573, 586 (1986). 
9. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James A. Bayard (Apr. [16-21]
1802), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-
25-02-0321 [https://perma.cc/9XX8-MMQ3] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
10. See generally RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 209-22.
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the development of the First Amendment (with Madison again 
playing the key role in drafting and adoption).11  Their efforts were 
warmly embraced and supported politically by eighteenth-century 
evangelicals who also demanded a strict separation of church and 
state.12  After the First Amendment was adopted, as state after 
state moved to eliminate vestiges of religious establishments and 
ensure religious freedom, they did so based on the 
Jeffersonian/Madisonian vision, often quoting them in the 
process.13  As Americans grappled with the meaning of religious 
freedom and church-state relations at the end of the eighteenth and 
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they turned again 
and again to Jefferson and Madison; their views and statements 
repeated so often as to be the equivalent of “viral.”14  No other 
politician, commentator, academic, or judge came close.  As 
textbooks were written they gave Jefferson and Madison credit for 
the development of the critical elements of American religious 
freedom.  Pamphlets encouraging emigration proclaimed the 
strength of religious freedom in America by quoting Jefferson’s 
Virginia Statute.15  It was no surprise, nor an anomaly, then, that 
when the Supreme Court first turned to the question of the 
meaning of religious freedom, it unanimously found that Jefferson’s 
and Madison’s views, in particular the Virginia Statute, the letter 
to the Danbury Baptists, and Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, “defined” American 
11. See generally The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom: The Road to
the First Amendment, BILL OF RIGHTS IN ACTION, Fall 2010, at 1, 
https://www.crf-usa.org/images/pdf/bria26_1_virginia.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D7KZ-ZF5Q]. 
12. JOHN A. RAGOSTA, WELLSPRING OF LIBERTY 125–36 (2010); John
Ragosta, Christian or Satanist displays? Keep them off gov’t land, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/contribu-
tors/2014/12/17/satanic-display-capitol-lansing/20563581/ 
[https://perma.cc/M8L6-V4TA] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
13. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 134–37.  Christine Leigh Heyrman, The Sep-
aration of Church and State from the American Revolution to the Early Repub-
lic, NAT’L HUMANITIES CTR., http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/eight-
een/ekeyinfo/sepchust.htm [perma.cc/Z72J-MDP3] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
14. See John Ragosta, Thomas Jefferson and Religious Freedom, THOMAS
JEFFERSON FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.monticello.org/site/research-
and-collections/thomas-jefferson-and-religious-freedom [perma.cc/AP4Y-SL 
B3]. 
15. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 142.
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religious freedom and the meaning of the First Amendment.16  
While many states only slowly implemented a Jeffersonian 
separation, as Steven Green shows, the Jeffersonian principle was 
broadly supported and criticized.17 
As many historians and lawyers have noted, to ask what the 
“Founders thought” about this or most issues, as if the Founders 
had one perspective or point of view, may often be relatively 
fruitless.18  It is, however, often very relevant to ask whether there 
are particular Founders whose views on a particular issue were 
(and are) broadly embraced and especially important to understand 
historical developments.  This is such a case. 
Still, Jefferson’s call for a “wall of separation” is only the turn 
of a phrase, and there are a host of questions that the metaphor 
does not immediately answer: While there may well be an 
institutional separation, what happens on both sides of the wall vis-
à-vis religion?  Or, in more picturesque terms, if you were sitting on 
the wall looking from side-to-side for religion, what would you see? 
Is one side of the wall devoid of actors who are motivated by 
religion?  Or, worse, bereft of morality (a rather ridiculous but 
politically potent claim made by some opponents of a Jeffersonian 
separation)?19  And, even on the private side of the wall, has the 
public square somehow been purged of religious actors or activities 
(another ridiculous canard of which Jefferson was accused)?20 
16. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–64 (1878).
17. See generally STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT: 
CHURCH AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2010).  Kent 
Greenawalt earlier suggested that evidence that people read the First Amend-
ment in a Jeffersonian/Madisonian voice at the time of its adoption, or by the 
time that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted (making the provisions ap-
plicable to the states) would be persuasive, but he was unaware of such evi-
dence.  See Kent Greenwalt, Some Reflections on Fundamental Questions about 
the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, in NO 
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 341, 345–47 (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr., eds., 2012). 
18. See, e.g., Derek H. Davis, Thomas Jefferson and the “Wall of Separa-
tion Metaphor,” 45 J. OF CHURCH AND STATE 5, 7–8, 14 (2003); Is this a Christian 
Nation?, https://www.au.org/resources/publications/is-america-a-christian-na-
tion [https://perma.cc/JTJ9-3F3U] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
19. E.g., Noah Feldman, A Church-State Solution, N.Y. TIMES (July 3,
2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/03/magazine/a-churchstate-solu-
tion.html [https://perma.cc/MS6D-9DCR]. 
20. Davis, supra note 18, at 6, 8.
550 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.26:545 
I began thinking about this essay as I was working with new 
guides at Monticello who will be faced with visitors’ questions 
concerning Jefferson and religion and religious freedom.  I am told 
that these questions are the most asked at Monticello.  (This is true 
in part because the issue of slavery, including Sally Hemings, is 
addressed proactively.)  One of the reasons for this is undoubtedly 
a growing unease in a large segment of the population that 
somehow something has gone “wrong” with religion or religious 
freedom in America and much of that unease seems to be vaguely 
related to Jefferson’s wall of separation. 
The cause of this unease apparently starts with shifts in 
demographics.  Others have noted the important demographic 
aspect of the “Christian nation” debate.21  What is a “Christian 
nation”?  Is this merely a demographic descriptor about the 
population, or does the moniker come with certain legal or policy 
restrictions?  For that matter, if this is a “Christian nation,” should 
that include certain obligations on the part of the nation?22  And if, 
at least initially, a demographic descriptor, what is the impact of 
change in America’s religious demographic? 
These are not new questions.  In the 1840s, William Swan 
Plumer, a well-known Presbyterian minister, addressed the 
question of whether the United States was a “Christian 
Commonwealth.”  His response continues to speak powerfully 
today:  
21. Is this a Christian Nation?, supra note 18, at 1.
22. Many of those urging that the United States is a “Christian nation”
avoid the issue of whether that moniker comes with certain obligations, for 
example to the poor, the sick, immigrants, etc.  In George Washington’s Fare-
well Address, when he urged support for virtue, morality, and religion (dis-
cussed further below), he adds: “[i]t will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, 
at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and 
too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevo-
lence.”  George Washington, Farewell Address 22 (Sept. 19, 1796), U.S. Gov’t 
Printing Office, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CDOC-
106sdoc21/pdf/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc21.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/VA6Y-UVL2] [hereinafter Washington’s Farewell Address]. 
Jefferson suggested a similar moral component to U.S. immigration policy. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Jan. 24, 1807), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-4939 
[https://perma.cc/VX5H-9TS6] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021); see also JOHN 
LELAND, THE VIRGINIA CHRONICLE (1790), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THE 
LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 92, 118 (L.F. Greene ed., 1845) (“If Christian nations, 
were nations of Christians these things would not be so.”). 
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If by these terms be meant, that the great majority of our 
people, who profess any religion, profess the [C]hristian 
religion, . . . then I do not object to such language.  But if it 
be intended to create a belief that [C]hristians are or ought 
to be by our laws entitled to any civil, political[,] or religious 
privileges except in common with Jews, Deists and 
Atheists, if there by any amongst us, then I utterly reject 
it.23 
Plumer’s comments imply several important aspects of the 
demographic debate: First, the question becomes increasingly 
complicated as the panoply of religions embraced by Americans 
expands both within and beyond Christianity, something that has 
certainly happened and that was, by more visionary early 
Americans, anticipated.  For example, in 1821, Thomas Jefferson 
famously insisted that religious freedom was intended to cover 
“within the mantle of it’s [sic] protection, the Jew and the Gentile, 
the Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo [sic], and infidel of every 
denomination.”24  Of course, there were not a lot of Hindus or 
Muslims in eighteenth-century Virginia (setting aside the enslaved 
community, many of whom embraced Islam, but it was not to them 
that Jefferson was likely referring).25  Yet Jefferson recognized that 
these people would be Americans and share in American religious 
freedom.  Today, their presence, and the presence of citizens from 
literally dozens of different religions, certainly complicates even the 
most basic assertion that the United States is a “Christian 
Nation.”26  
23. WILLIAM S. PLUMER, THE SUBSTANCE OF AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE
INDISCRIMINATE INCORPORATION OF CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES 11–12 
(1847). 
24. Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, 6 Jan.–29 July 1821 (Jan. 6, 1821),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-
1756 [https://perma.cc/3T88-C2RC] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
25. See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Antebellum Islam, 58 HOWARD L.J.
141 (2014). 
26. Jefferson’s comments were echoed by nineteenth century Virginia ju-
rists in discussing the import of his Statute for Establishing Religious Free-
dom:  
Declaring to the Christian and the Mahometan, the Jew and the Gen-
tile, the Epicurean and the Platonists (if any such there be amongst 
us,) that so long as they keep within [the law’s] pale, all are equally 
objects of its protection; securing safety to the people, safety to the 
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The issue becomes even further muddied if and when a 
majority of Americans cease to affiliate themselves with 
Christianity.  The current trend is moving strongly in that 
direction.  By the mid-2010s, for the first time as a nation, white 
Christians constituted less than half of the U.S. population, while 
as recently as 1976, that figure was over eighty percent.27  In 
twenty states, no single religious group accounts for a higher share 
of the population than the religiously unaffiliated.28  
These demographic shifts¾both the presence of so many 
religions that appear to the majority to be “different,” “new,” and 
“foreign” and the decline in Christianity as a share of the 
population¾seem to instill doubt, fear in some people, about the 
direction of the nation, the role of religion in the nation, and, 
perhaps, their own religion.  With those fears and doubts, many 
cling with increased fervor to the hope of identifying a mythical 
“Christian nation” and then, unfortunately, imposing it upon 
others. 
The unease that so many seem to feel in this regard, and the 
necessity of expressing that unease at Monticello and in the context 
of Jefferson’s “wall of separation,” relates to a pervasive, if 
simplistic and misguided, belief that a wall of separation is 
somehow “anti-religion” and that Jefferson so intended.  This view 
has been promoted for political reasons for literally centuries. 
government, safety to religion; and (leaving reason free to combat er-
ror) securing purity of faith and practice far more effectively than by 
clothing ministers of religion with exclusive temporal privileges; and 
exposing them to the corrupting influence of wealth and power. 
Perry v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. (3 Gratt.) 602, 612 (Va. 1846).  Both those who 
supported and opposed a separation of church and state recognized this fact. 
For example, Alexander McLeod, a nineteenth century Reformed Presbyterian 
minister, preaching against a separation of church and state bemoaned that 
“[t]he US government gave as much support to ‘the Mahometan and the athe-
ist’ as it did to the religion of Jesus.”  JOSEPH S. MOORE, FOUNDING SINS: HOW
A GROUP OF ANTISLAVERY RADICALS FOUGHT TO PUT CHRIST INTO THE
CONSTITUTION 66 (2016) (quoting ALEXANDER MCLEOD, MESSIAH, GOVERNOR OF
THE NATIONS OF THE EARTH: A DISCOURSE 44–45 (1804)); see also RAGOSTA, su-
pra note 1, at 155–67 (discussing viewpoints on non-preference of the Christian 
religion in America from the founding era to the late nineteenth century). 
27. ROBERT P. JONES & DANIEL COX, AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS
IDENTITY: FINDINGS FROM THE 2016 AMERICAN VALUES ATLAS 7 (2017), 
https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/PRRI-Religion-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W9FK-7KFB]. 
28. Id. at  7–8.
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During the explosive election of 1800, Jefferson’s opponents listed 
a host of dangers to religion were Jefferson elected: Bibles would be 
seized, churches degraded, women attacked, etc.29  One opponent 
asked if there could be any doubt that if Jefferson was elected the 
“morals which protect our lives from the knife of the assassin—
which guard the chastity of our wives and daughters from seduction 
and violence—defend our property from plunder and devastation, 
and shield our religion from contempt and profanation, will not be 
trampled upon and exploded.”30  Jefferson’s supporters sought to 
counter the canard, arguing that politics had “converted the elegant 
reasoning of Jefferson against religious establishments, into a 
blasphemous argument against religion itself.”31  In the midst of 
the election of 1804, another supporter explained that the claim by 
Jefferson’s political opponents that “religion is in danger” is made 
“because Mr. Jefferson, in his political capacity lets it alone, lets it 
have its own free course, is not inclined to interpose with his power 
in favor of any sect, but is a friend to free, complete and perfect 
toleration.”32  But these efforts to explain Jefferson’s position never 
quite stamped out the easily-made and politically-convenient 
attacks.33 
The fear¾or at least the political usefulness of the 
canard¾persists.  It is as if the lies told about Jefferson’s religion 
in the election of 1800¾his alleged atheism, his intent to seize and 
burn Bibles, to sell the daughters of America into prostitution, to 
destroy any morality or ethics in government, etc.¾still live.  The 
impression seems to be that Jefferson’s wall of separation is an 
attack on public religion, that religion should be shorn from the 
29. John A. Ragosta, Jefferson, Madison, and Adams: Conversations on
Religious Liberty, in RIVAL VISIONS: HOW JEFFERSON AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES
DEFINED THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 163, 170-71 (Dustin Gish & Andrew 
Bibby eds., 2021); see Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Jefferson and the Election of 1800: 
A Case Study in the Political Smear, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 467, 472–75 (1948). 
30. NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE UNITED STATES IN 1800: HENRY ADAMS
REVISITED 48 (1988) (quoting A SHORT ADDRESS TO THE VOTERS OF DELAWARE 
(Sept. 21, 1800)). 
31. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 34 (quoting A Voter, MD. GAZETTE, Aug. 28,
1800). 
32. Id. at 34, 241 n.58 (quoting PORTLAND E. ARGUS, Nov. 16, 1804).
33. Lerche, supra note 29, at 472; see Ragosta, supra note 29, at 169–74.
These are just a few of the many attacks on Jefferson.  See generally RAGOSTA, 
supra note 1, at 19–39. 
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public square (in this context meaning both private and 
government activity in public).  The fact that separation is only a 
policy against government religion or churches’ (institutional) 
interference in government is ignored.34  
Certainly, Jefferson never believed or advocated that religion 
should be shorn from the public square, so long as the religion was 
entirely voluntary and private¾neither embraced, compelled, nor 
encouraged or discouraged by government.35  In fact, he fought the 
impression even in his own time.  When the state funding for his 
beloved University of Virginia was threatened because of his (and 
the institution’s) alleged infidelity and opposition to “a public 
establishment of any religious instruction,” he bemoaned to 
Thomas Cooper that “[i]n our University you know there is no 
professorship of divinity.  [A] handle has been made of this to 
disseminate an idea that this is an institution, not merely of no 
religion, but against all religion.”36  Later he would tell a political 
ally that the claim that he sought a “government without religion” 
was a “slander[ ].”37  Admittedly, Jefferson believed that in a 
rational American republic, the successful religion in the public 
square would be Unitarianism, but he believed that this would be 
the result of citizens’ choices in a free market of religion.38  He never 
sought to ban public religion.  
34. “Government religion” seems to be an oxymoron, but the Supreme
Court’s recent embrace of corporate religion might give pause in that regard. 
See generally Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Reli-
gious Exemptions, 38 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35 (2015). 
35. HARRY Y. GAMBLE, GOD ON THE GROUNDS 3 (2020).
36. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-3137 
[https://perma.cc/6PNC-2E9Y] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
37. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to DeWitt Clinton (May 24, 1807), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-5622 
[https://perma.cc/6YFW-ZYUR] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
38. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Waterhouse (June 26,
1822), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-
01-02-2905 [https://perma.cc/D7A4-UBPL] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) (Jeffer-
son predicted in 1822 that “there is not a young man now living in the US who
will not die an Unitarian”).  A few months later, “[c]oding reason as masculine,”
and demonstrating deep misgivings about evangelical enthusiasm, Jefferson
wrote to William Short that were a Unitarian minister to come to Virginia, he
“would gather in to their fold every man under the age of 40.  female fanaticism
might hold out awhile longer.”  ALAN TAYLOR, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S EDUCATION
224 (2019) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Oct. 19,
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Perhaps most telling in this regard is the fact that Jefferson’s 
views on religion and separation of church and state did not prove 
to be a death knell for religion in the early republic as his political 
and religious opponents predicted.  In fact, quite the contrary. 
Freed from government interference, enjoying a free market for 
religion, religion and religious organizations experienced a 
separation-induced explosion in a period referred to as the Second 
Great Awakening.  It was in this period that many new American 
sects arose: Disciples of Christ, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, African Methodist Episcopal Church, Oneidians, 
Seventh-Day Adventists, etc.39  Alexis de Tocqueville saw the broad 
influence of religion in America as the direct result of separation.40  
Theodore Dwight Woolsey, the President of Yale and of the 
Evangelical Alliance, would explain in 1873 that “all unite in 
believing” that separation at the Founding “was a blessing to 
religion.”41  In fact, some of those who had previously opposed 
Jefferson based on his efforts to separate church and state conceded 
(some reluctantly) that the process of freeing religion from 
government and embracing the “voluntary principle”¾religious 
choice had to be entirely voluntary, uninfluenced by government 
inducement or discouragement¾had greatly benefited religion. 
Lyman Beecher, a leading nineteenth century evangelical and no 
friend of Jefferson’s, conceded that the end of the establishment and 
adoption of the voluntary principle was “the best thing that ever 
happened to the State of Connecticut.  It cut the churches loose from 
dependence on state support.  It threw them wholly on their own 
resources and on God.”42  As Andrew Seidel concludes, “[a] secular 
1822), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-
01-02-3103 [perma.cc/J6TD-3W6K] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021)).
39. See generally Curtis D. Johnson, “Sectarian Nation”: Religious Diver-
sity in Antebellum America, 22 OAH MAG. OF HIST. 14 (2008). 
40. See James T. Schleifler, Tocqueville, Religion, and “Democracy in
America”: Some Essential Questions, 3 AM. POL. THOUGHT 254, 258–60 (2014). 
41. T. Jeremy Gunn, The Separation of Church and State versus Religion
in the Public Square, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 17, at 15, 
33 (quoting THEODORE DWIGHT WOOLSEY, THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES IN REGARD TO RELIGION 4 (1873)). 
42. 1 LYMAN BEECHER, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LYMAN BEECHER 152–53 
(Barbara M. Cross ed., 1961) (emphasis original). 
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state fostered a religious people; a seeming paradox that has been 
borne out.”43 
These thoughts led me to consider several questions that 
engaged Jefferson, and continue to engage us, relating to the 
religiosity of the American people in the face of a high wall of 
separation between church and state: First, if the government 
cannot be “religious” does that interfere with the government 
encouraging virtue and morality, characteristics that early 
Americans almost universally saw as essential in a republic? 
Second, how, if at all, are government officials to express their own 
religiosity?  Third, to the extent that the First Amendment is 
intended to prevent government “coercion” in the area of religion, 
does Jefferson (and history) speak persuasively to the meaning of 
coercion?  Can the government “endorse” religion or speak in a 
religious voice, without running afoul of the Establishment Clause? 
Finally, I have several brief historic observations on the question of 
how the free exercise of religion is to continue on the private side of 
the wall in the face of laws that interfere with some people’s 
religious practices? 
In analyzing those issues, I will focus particularly on 
Jefferson’s thought (and James Madison’s, with Jefferson’s trusty 
lieutenant never more in agreement with Jefferson than on the 
issue of church-state relations).  Not only has the Jeffersonian 
vision of a wall of separation played a central role in the 
development and understanding of American religious freedom, but 
my current position gives me an opportunity to reflect regularly on 
that vision and to discuss it with the public.  I do not expect to cover 
43. Andrew L. Seidel, Bad History, Bad Opinions: How “Law Office His-
tory” Is Leading the Courts Astray on School Board Prayer and the First 
Amendment, 12 N.E. U. L.R. 248, 318 (2020).  Even today, with the separation 
of church and state, the United States is one of the most religious of the devel-
oped nations.  IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, 
RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 3 (2014).  The two are clearly related and were understood 
to be so during the founding era: “Madison, for example, contrasted the erosion 
of religion in establishment states with the flourishing of religion in nonestab-
lishment states of his day.”  John Witte, Jr., Introduction to NO ESTABLISHMENT 
OF RELIGION, supra note 17, at 3, 8.  Today, I remind guides at Monticello that 
an establishment persists (in various forms) in Italy, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, for example, but their churches are empty compared to churches in 
the United States.  See Being Christian in Western Europe, PEW RES. CTR. (May 
29, 2018), https://www.pewforum.org/2018/05/29/being-christian-in-western-
europe/ [https://perma.cc/YQ9G-FLD2]. 
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any of these issues exhaustively, but, perhaps, to look at some of 
these important issues in a somewhat new way.  
I. WHY A WALL?
It is useful to begin with at least some notion of why Jefferson 
sought broad religious freedom and a strict wall of separation.  His 
views in this regard arose from three (interrelated and overlapping) 
motivations. Commentators generally attribute Jefferson’s 
insistence on separation to political and philosophical motivations, 
and these were certainly important.  I believe, however, that 
Jefferson likely shared with eighteenth-century evangelicals’ 
theological reasons to insist upon a wall of separation. 
A. Political Motivations
The political motivations for a separation of church and state
are, perhaps, most obvious.  At the time of the American 
Revolution, Virginia still had an established church¾the Church of 
England¾and religious dissenters (especially evangelical 
Presbyterians and Baptists) had faced serious discrimination and 
then persecution in colonial Virginia.44  With the onset of the 
Revolution, Virginia’s dissenters insisted upon religious freedom, 
including a separation of church and state, in return for their 
whole-hearted support for the military fight against Britain.45  
With dissenters representing from one-fifth to perhaps more than 
one-third of the population, and especially dominant among the 
rifle-toting Presbyterian settlers in the Shenandoah Valley, their 
aid was desperately needed, and the establishment substantially 
yielded.46  Certainly, the evangelical dissenters, having suffered 
serious discrimination and persecution at the hands of the state 
because of their religious beliefs, had a strong political reason to 
demand separation.47 
These concerns also motivated Jefferson and Madison.  The 
latter was apparently brought to his views on church-state relations 
44. RAGOSTA, supra note 12, at 3-13.  Other colonies also had varying lev-
els of official establishments, but Virginia’s took on an outsized role both in the 
Revolution generally and particularly on the issue of church-state relations. 
See generally id. 
45. Id. at 6–7.
46. Id. at 3–4.
47. Id. at 6.
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in part because of the attacks on dissenters immediately before the 
Revolution.  Writing to a good friend from his Princeton days, 
Madison let his anger and exasperation boil over:  
That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution 
rages among some and to their eternal Infamy the Clergy 
can furnish their Quota of Imps for such business.  This 
vexes me the most of any thing whatever.  There are at this 
{time?} in the adjacent County not less than 5 or 6 well 
meaning men in close Goal for publishing their religious 
Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox.  I have 
neither patience to hear talk or think of any thing relative 
to this matter, for I have squabbled and scolded abused and 
ridiculed so long about it, [to so lit]tle purpose that I am 
without common patience.48 
Jefferson, returning to Virginia in late 1776 from the Continental 
Congress (after drafting the Declaration of Independence), joined 
the new Virginia House of Delegates and helped to lead the 
legislative battles to dismantle the establishment.49  Late in life, he 
would refer to these legislative battles as the “severest contest in 
which I have ever been engaged,” an extraordinary statement from 
someone with as full a history of legislative battles as Jefferson.50 
Informed by a long history of political discord fed by church-
state relations, and committed to the civil equality of all citizens, 
Jefferson saw a political necessity in a wall of separation.  He 
believed that history had a clear lesson: political tyrants used 
religious leaders, and religious leaders used political tyrants, to 
prop each other up at the expense of the people.51  Jefferson 
bemoaned the alliance of “kings, nobles and priests,” telling his 
mentor George Wythe that this alliance had “loaded with misery” 
48. Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-01-02-0029 
[perma.cc/493H-PWH4] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
49. Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, 6 Jan.–29 July 1821 (Jan. 6, 1821),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-
1756 [https://perma.cc/GKQ5-TA9T] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).  
50. Id.
51. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Sep. 23, 1800), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-32-02-0102 
[https://perma.cc/K2F5-6CUT] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
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the people of France.52  Twenty-eight years later he was still 
adamant about the danger that such an alliance posed for the body 
politic: “[I]n every country and in every age, the priest has been 
hostile to liberty.  [H]e is always in alliance with the Despot.”53 
“[M]isgovernment” was the product of “the selfish interests of kings, 
nobles and priests,” he informed a favorite granddaughter.54  He 
told his dear friend John Adams that separation of church and state 
“put down the aristocracy of the clergy, and restored to the citizen 
the freedom of the mind.”55 
The danger was that an alliance between aristocrats and clergy 
would seek to usurp the proper role of free citizens.  Governments 
in Europe, owing “their organisation [sic] [to] kings, hereditary 
nobles, and priests,” were unresponsive to the people.56  Writing to 
a Jewish leader, Jefferson used the third person to report that:  
[I]t excites in him the gratifying reflection that his own
country has been the first to prove to the world two truths,
the most salutary to human society, that man can govern
himself, and that religious freedom is the most effectual
anodyne against religious dissension: the maxim of civil
government being reversed in that of religion, where it’s
[sic] true form is “divided we stand, united we fall.”57
52. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Aug. 13, 1786), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0162 
[perma.cc/3A5J-MR8Z] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Horatio G. Spafford (Mar. 17, 1814),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-07-02-
0167 [perma.cc/9C2E-WXDK] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
54. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Ellen Wayles Randolph Coolidge
(Aug. 27, 1825), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jef-
ferson/98-01-02-5493 [https://perma.cc/K9Y4-2CM7] (last visited Feb. 17, 
2021). 
55. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0446 
[https://perma.cc/RL7B-CCDY] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
56. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Jun. 12, 1823),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-
3562 [https://perma.cc/2GHZ-LZJZ] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
57. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jacob De La Motta (Sept. 1, 1820),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-
1488 [perma.cc/JLM7-2LNU] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
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Given the history of religious strife in Europe in which “oceans 
of human blood” had flowed because of wars over religious dogma, 
religious freedom and separation in America would be especially 
essential because that republic would include people from a broad 
mix of regions, ethnicities, and religions.58  Similarly, modern court 
cases rely on the central role that maintaining religious peace and 
discouraging religious discord played in the crafting of the First 
Amendment.59 
B. Enlightenment (Philosophical) Motivations
Not surprisingly, Jefferson’s Enlightenment philosophy also
supported a separation of church and state for similar reasons.  The 
progress of the human mind is at the center of the hopes of the 
Enlightenment, but Jefferson believed that the full progress of 
which the mind is capable would be impossible if religious leaders, 
using the power and authority of the state, could impose or coerce 
(or even use state authority to encourage) religious beliefs.60  This 
interfered with the “freedom of the mind” which Jefferson referred 
to in his October 1813 letter to Adams.61  It was in this context of 
religious freedom that Jefferson famously wrote that “I have sworn 
upon the altar of god eternal hostility against every form of tyranny 
over the mind of man.”62  Jefferson clearly understood this 
insistence on free inquiry as being good for, rather than harmful to, 
religion.  “Reason and free enquiry, . . . [g]ive a loose to them, they 
will support the true religion, by bringing every false one to their 
tribunal, to the test of their investigation.”63 
In fact, Jefferson believed that no true or honest belief could be 
imposed upon the mind by government coercion, but that the effort 
58. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Fishback (Draft) (Sept. 27,
1809), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-
01-02-0437-0002 [https://perma.cc/7KTN-5HTA] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
59. See, e.g., Sch. Dist.of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214
(1963). 
60. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, H.D. 82, 1779 Gen. Assemb.
(Va. 1786), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jeffer-
son/01-02-02-0132-0004-0082 [https://perma.cc/53ZT-XSLE] (last visited Feb. 
17, 2021) [hereinafter Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom]. 
61. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, supra note 55.
62. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, supra note 51.
63. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (William
Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1982) (1785). 
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to do so would thwart the necessary growth of intellectual freedom 
and thought.  It was for this reason that Jefferson objected to 
“putting the Bible and Testament into the hands of the children at 
an age when their judgments are not sufficiently matured for 
religious enquiries.”64  Alan Taylor explains that “[b]y precluding 
rational and critical inquiry, Jefferson alleged, premature exposure 
to theology prepared children to submit to arbitrary authority as 
adults.  If kept free from religion in the early classroom, however, 
children would have time to cultivate a moral sense, which he 
deemed natural to every person.”65  This is why he urged his 
nephew Peter Carr of the necessity of thinking for oneself, 
especially in the context of religion.66 
Believing that a church-state alliance encouraged 
ignorance¾blind following of an “official” worldview rather than 
rational inquiry¾Jefferson reasoned: 
[O]rganisation [sic] of kings, hereditary nobles, and priests
. . .  to constrain the brute force of the people, . . . deem it
necessary to keep them down by hard labor, poverty and
ignorance, and to take from them, as from bees, so much of
their earnings as that unremitting labour shall be
necessary to obtain a sufficient surplus barely to sustain a
scanty and miserable life.67
Eliminating any government control or influence in the realm of 
religion would prevent this danger.  Explaining Jefferson’s view, 
historian Johann Neem makes the same point: “[B]ecause God had 
created ‘the mind free,’ each person had to make his or her own 
determinations about faith. . . .  Since God had granted us the 
ability to think, to deny us that right was sinful as well as 
tyrannical.”68 
64. Id. at 147.
65. TAYLOR, supra note 38, at 164.
66. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-12-02-0021 
[perma.cc/A78Y-NU4W] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
67. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, supra note 56.
68. Johann N. Neem, A Republican Reformation: Thomas Jefferson’s Civil
Religion and the Separation of Church from State, in A COMPANION TO THOMAS
JEFFERSON 91, 95 (Francis D. Cogliano ed., 2011). 
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Madison believed the same. He had a clear “conviction that the 
most harmful effect of ‘established religion’ (that is, compelled and 
formalized religion) was its suppression of the vital, useful energies 
that flowed from the unrestrained practice of religion in the public 
sphere—and eventually to the practice of citizenship in a self-
governing society,” Ralph Ketcham argues.69  Free thought was 
essential to an enlightened republic, but one could not have political 
freedom or freedom of the mind in the face of the cooperation of 
church and state.  For Jefferson and Madison, Jack Rakove 
explains, “[t]he attack on establishment flowed logically, perhaps 
even necessarily, from the commitment to freedom of conscience.”70  
As Jefferson himself put it, “[f]or the use of . . .  reason . . . every 
one [sic] is responsible to the god who has placed it in his breast, as 
a light for his guidance, and that, by which alone, he will be 
judged.”71  
Both the political and philosophical justifications for 
separation were particularly focused on protecting religious 
minorities as they faced the risk of political prosecution and their 
thought was more likely to be impaired by government decrees 
touching religion. 
C. Theological Motivations
Jefferson spent a great deal of time studying religion
(including comparative religions) and thinking about his own 
beliefs.72  These were not matters to which he had given only 
69. Ralph Ketcham, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and the Meaning
of “Establishment of Religion” in Eighteenth-Century Virginia, in NO 
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 17, at 158, 160. 
70. Jack N. Rakove, Beyond Locke, Beyond Belief: The Nexus of Free Exer-
cise and Separation of Church and State, in RELIGION, STATE, AND SOCIETY: 
JEFFERSON’S WALL OF SEPARATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 37, 47 (Robert 
Fatton, Jr. & R. K. Ramazani eds., 2009). 
71. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Carver (Dec. 4, 1823), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-3903 
[https://perma.cc/2U37-BR4S] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
72. Jefferson’s study of comparative religion explains his purchase of a
1734 edition of George Sales’ translation of the Koran in October 1765 while 
Jefferson was studying law in Williamsburg.  Claims that Jefferson purchased 
the book merely as a means to “know your enemy” during the conflict with 
Barbary pirates are false and revisionist.  See Wm. Scott Harrop, Jefferson 
Unafraid of the Koran (Jan. 17, 2007), 
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passing consideration.  Jefferson, a deep theist, believed in a 
“benevolent creator” God who deserved to be praised.73  He 
believed, at least early in life, but likely later as well, in an afterlife 
with rewards and punishment.74  He believed that people would 
(and should) be judged on their actions, part of his firm 
renunciation of Calvinism and the idea of salvation by grace 
alone.75  He rejected many of the central tenets of Christianity: 
Jesus’ divinity, the resurrection, the atonement, original sin, 
Biblical miracles, the Trinity.  Critically, having studied many 
religions, from classical Greece through his own era, Jefferson 
concluded that all religions agreed on the fundamental rules of 
morality and virtue.  Their disagreements tended to be overly 
technical and what he saw as less important issues of dogma, issues 
for which rivers of blood had been spilled in Europe.76 
His views on religion contributed importantly to his views on 
religious freedom, including separation of church and state and 
arguably paralleled the theological reasons why many eighteenth-
century evangelicals supported a strict separation.  
A central element of religion for eighteenth-century 
evangelicals was an insistence on a personal relationship with God, 
i.e., one not mediated through priests, bishops, or the
government.77  Theologically, evangelicals reasoned that since all
God wanted from humans was a personal commitment, that
commitment had to be entirely voluntary, a free will commitment.
A commitment to God resulting from government intervention was
of no interest or value to God.78  Presbyterian clergy in Virginia
http://www.payvand.com/news/07/jan/1194.html [https://perma.cc/3JS9-N8 
A7]. 
73. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac Story (Dec. 5, 1801), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-36-02-0025 
[https://perma.cc/Q73W-XA6M] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
74. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Page (Jul. 15, 1763), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0004 
[https://perma.cc/DP2L-H7ER] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
75. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, supra note 36.
76. See, e.g., RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 8, 16–17, 26.
77. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 22–23.
78. See James H. Smylie, Jefferson’s Statute for Religious Freedom: The
Hanover Presbytery Memorials, 1776–1786, 63 AM. PRESBYTERIANS J. 355, 371 
(1985) (quoting Petition from the Inhabitants of Augusta County to the Gen-
eral Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Aug. 13, 1785)). 
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explained that “[r]eligion is altogether personal . . . it is not, cannot, 
and ought not to be, resigned to the will of the society at large; & 
much less to the Legislature.”79  Rejecting a proposed tax that 
would have paid clergy a salary, these Presbyterians added: 
It is urged, indeed, by the Abettors of this Bill, that it would 
be the means of cherishing Religion and Morality among 
the Citizens.  But, it appears from fact, that these can be 
promoted only by the internal Conviction of the Mind, & its 
voluntary choice which such Establishments cannot 
affect.80  
Additional petitions further underscore this religious relationship: 
“For the discharge of the duties of Religion every man is to account 
for himself as an individual in a future state . . . not to be under the 
direction or Influence of any Human being.”81  “But that the duty 
which we owe our Creator and the manner of discharging it can only 
be directed by reason and conviction; and is no where [sic] 
cognizable but at the Tribunal of the Universal Judge.”82 
Other ministers echoed similar theological reasons to keep the 
government out of religion.  Baptists fighting the proposed tax 
assessment to support religion insisted that the legislature “leave 
them entirely free in matters of Religion.”83  During the hotly-
contested election of 1800, a Democratic-Republican minister 
79. Id. (quoting Petition from Augusta County, supra note 78)
80. Id. (quoting Petition from Augusta County, supra note 78); This and
other cited petitions are also available from a collection maintained by the Li-
brary of Virginia.  See Legislative Petitions Digital Collection, LIBRARY OF VA., 
http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions.  In the past, the Library 
conveniently maintained a separate collection of petitions related to religion, 
but they are now part of a combined collection. 
81. Petition from the Inhabitants of Rockbridge County to the General As-
sembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (November 2, 1785) (emphasis 
added); see also RAGOSTA, supra note 12, at 152 (“It is the duty of every man for 
himself to take care of his immortal interests in a future state, where we are 
to account for our conduct as individuals; and it is by no means the business of 
a Legislature to attend to this.” (quoting Petition from Presbyterian Clergy to 
the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (November 12, 1784))). 
82. Smylie, supra note 78, at 362 (quoting Petition from the Hanover Pres-
bytery to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (July-Sept., 
1776)).  
83. See Petition from the Inhabitants of Amelia County to the General As-
sembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 18, 1785).  This was a version 
of the “Spirit of the Gospel” petition copied by numerous Baptist congregations. 
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explained that “[r]eligion is a concern between the soul of a man 
and his maker.”84  As such, Stanley Griswold explained, 
“[w]herever religion has been leagued with temporal policy . . . it 
has uniformly been corrupted.”85  John Leland, a leading Baptist 
minister in Virginia at the time, was adamant: 
Every man must give an account of himself to God, and 
therefore every man ought to be at liberty to serve God in 
a way that he can best reconcile to his conscience.  If 
government can answer for individuals at the day of 
judgment, let men be controlled by it in religious matters; 
otherwise, let men be free.86   
Any interference in religion was counter-productive: 
“[c]ompulsion in matters of Religion would be so far from engaging 
men to be what it proposes, that it would rather prejudice them 
against it.”87  The point was made by Isaac Backus, a 
Massachusetts Baptist minister, in the context of a draft bill of 
rights for Massachusetts: “[a]s . . . nothing can be true religion but 
a voluntary obedience unto [God’s] revealed will, . . . every person 
has an unalienable right to act in religious affairs according to the 
full persuasion of his own mind, where others are not injured 
thereby.”88 
Jefferson made important statements concerning religion that 
have often been interpreted as simply reflecting his well-known 
interest in privacy, but they seem to echo these theological 
concerns.  Jefferson would often respond to inquiries concerning his 
own religion that “religion is a matter which lies solely between 
84. STANLEY GRISWOLD, TRUTH ITS OWN TEST AND GOD ITS ONLY JUDGE
(1800), reprinted in ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, FINDING JEFFERSON app. B, at 199, 
201 (2008) (emphasis removed). 
85. Robert J. Imholt, Timothy Dwight, Federalist Pope of Connecticut, 73 
NEW ENG. Q. 386, 396 (2000) (quoting GRISWOLD, supra note 84, at 17–18). 
86. JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE (1791), re-
printed in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND, supra note 22, at 
177, 181. 
87. See Petition from the Baptist Association of Powhatan County to the
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 3, 1785). 
88. Marci A. Hamilton & Rachel Steamer, The Religious Origins of Dises-
tablishment Principles, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1755, 1775 (2006) (quoting Wil-
liam G. McLoughlin, Introduction to ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC 
FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, reprinted in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND 
CALVINISM 304 (William G. McLoughlin ed., 1968)). 
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Man & his God.”89  Religion is “a matter between every man and 
his maker, in which no other, & far less the public, ha[s] a right to 
intermeddle.”90  He warned another correspondent, “say nothing of 
my religion.  it is known to god and myself alone.”91  This was not 
a mere matter of convenience or political expediency, but a matter 
of theological principle for Jefferson: 
I cannot give up my guidance to the magistrate; because he 
knows no more of the way to heaven than I do & is less 
concerned to direct me right than I am to go right. . . . 
[co]mpulsion in religion is distinguished peculiarly from 
compulsion in every other thing. I may grow rich by art I 
am compelled to follow, I may recover health by medicines 
I am compelled to take ag[ains]t.  my own judgm[en]t, but 
I cannot be saved by a worship I disbelieve & abhor.92 
Laws could not provide for a defect in personal belief and action: 
“[L]aws provide against injury from others; but not from ourselves.  
God himself will not save men against their wills.”93 
Madison made a similar profession in his famous Memorial & 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments: “[i]t is the duty of 
every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as 
he believes to be acceptable to him.”94 
89. See Letter to the Danbury Baptists, supra note 1.  It is notable that
Jefferson, while often insisting that he would not speak of his religion, seemed 
to be constantly speaking and writing about it.  By comparison, historians have 
relatively little on James Madison’s religious beliefs and serious study on the 
topic is overdue. 
90. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Rush (May 31, 1813), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0155 
[perma.cc/9WZL-F7GF] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
91. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Delaplaine (Dec. 25, 1816),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-10-02-
0475 [https://perma.cc/6Z4A-HZ4J] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
92. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury (Oct. 11–Dec.
9, 1776), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jeffer-
son/01-01-02-0222-0007 [https://perma.cc/LZ4K-NN33] (last visited Feb. 19, 
2021) [hereinafter Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury]. 
93. Id.
94. James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
sessments ([ca. June 20] 1785), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.ar-
chives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163 [perma.cc/V58Y-5JF7] (last vis-
ited Feb. 19, 2021). 
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Jefferson urged family members that they needed to come to 
their own religious beliefs through private inquiry.  He famously 
wrote to his nephew Peter Carr urging him to:  
[S]hake off all the fears and servile prejudices under which
weak minds are servilely crouched.  Fix reason firmly in
her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion.
Question with boldness even the existence of god; because
if there be one, he must more approve the homage of
reason, than that of blindfolded fear.95
Referring to the coalition of evangelicals and political rationalists 
who played such a critical role in the development of American 
religious freedom, “strange bedfellows” indeed, Alan Taylor 
explains that “[e]vangelicals and rationalists found common ground 
by emphasizing individual, free choice as the basis of society—
within limits set by race and gender.”96  
Jefferson’s theological concerns with separation are also 
evident in his later-in-life devotion to the philosophy (but not the 
divinity) of Jesus and a rather snarky comment that his crucifixion 
was the first fruit of the cooperation of church and state.97 
95. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, supra note 66.  Trenchard
and Gordon, in their well-known “Cato’s Letters,” explained: “Every Man’s Re-
ligion is his own; nor can the Religion of any Man . . . be the Religion of another 
Man, unless he also chooses it; which Action utterly excludes all Force, Power 
or Government” independent of all “human Directions.”  See GREEN, supra note 
1, at 53 (quoting John Trenchard, Cato’s Letters, No. 60 (Jan. 6, 1721), re-
printed in NEIL H. COGAN, CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY 
COLLECTION 141 (1999)). 
96. TAYLOR, supra note 38, at 58.  Michael McConnell noted that “[i]t is,
indeed, a remarkable feature of the debates over establishment and disestab-
lishment at the founding that the advocates of the establishment tended to 
offer secular justifications grounded in the social utility of religion, whereas 
the most prominent voices for disestablishment often focused more on the the-
ological objections.”  Michael W. McConnell, Establishment at the Founding, in 
NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 17, at 45, 64. 
97. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 18.  Jefferson remarked that, utilizing
the power of church and state, the clergy had “crucified their own Savior who 
preached that their kingdom was not of this world, and all who practice on that 
precept must expect the extreme of their wrath.”  Id. (quoting Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln (Aug. 26, 1801), in 35 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 147 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2008)). 
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II. THE WALL OF SEPARATION
It is useful to start with the fundamental question: What does 
the wall separate?  On the one side, obviously, is the state, which is 
to say the government.  Simplistically, one might conclude that this 
side of the wall is, or should be, entirely areligious.  Indeed, it is the 
fear of such areligion or amorality that, in part, seems to energize 
much of the opposition to a wall of separation between church and 
state.  The complexity here is that while the government itself is to 
be areligious, the “government” includes the individuals who make 
up the government, from military personnel who might wish to 
have chaplains to any government official who, as an official, does 
not abandon his or her religion.  Nor were they expected to.  It is a 
truism that a person’s religion will, and should, affect his or her 
moral decisions, whether or not he or she is a government official. 
Jefferson never expected nor wished that government officials 
would behave in an amoral manner or in a manner that ignored 
morality.  As Stephen Green quite rightly observes, “a majority of 
Framers expected that Christian principles would continue to play 
a role in fostering civic virtue and providing a moral context for 
public and private activity.”98  
On the other side of the wall is the church, but more fully the 
private sector.  To be clear, the private side of the wall does not 
mean “non-public” in the sense that activity cannot occur in the 
public square; it means non-governmental.  A simple example 
suffices: a Christmas crèche scene displayed in a government 
building raises questions on the government-side of the wall.  The 
same crèche, displayed publicly at a private corporation’s 
headquarters, is a matter for the private side of the wall.99  
Separation “did not refer to a cultural separation of religion from 
society, as many today assume,” Derek Davis explains, “but rather 
98. GREEN, supra note 1, at 180.
99. For example, after Allegheny County’s government Christmas crèche
display was declared unconstitutional in County of Allegheny v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1989), it was displayed at the U.S. Steel 
building in downtown Pittsburgh, see Pittsburgh Creche Endowment Fund, 
THE PITTSBURGH FOUND.,  https://pittsburghfoundation.org/creche 
[https://perma.cc/5MXT-AAJW] (last visited Mar. 12, 2021). 
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an institutional separation of governmental and ecclesiastical 
power.”100 
In thinking about issues on the two sides of the wall, it is useful 
(and calming) to remember that many of the fundamental church-
state issues have been resolved and are still not under serious 
challenge, even with the increased pressure of some from within 
and without government to breach the wall.  Direct support for an 
individual religion or sect is undoubtedly unconstitutional.  
Similarly, financial support for all religion¾similar to Virginia’s 
proposed general assessment bill¾in exclusion to other non-
religious activities, would quickly be held to be unconstitutional.101  
Nor can the government engage in mandating (or prohibiting) 
religious activities (other than through neutral legislation not 
targeted at religion or religious activities, discussed below).102 
Similarly, there is a broad consensus that government cannot 
openly embrace a particular religion or sect103 (although the views 
of several Justices on the necessity of coercion in the form of a fine 
or punishment for a government violation of the Establishment 
Clause, discussed further below, would, if adopted by a majority of 
the Court, effectively reverse that long-standing prohibition).104 
Looking at the issues that are still hotly contested, and, in 
particular, questions that elicit interest of the public either directly 
or implicitly, this Article will address four more complex problems 
with a particular focus on Jefferson’s thoughts.  First, if virtue and 
100. Compare Derek H. Davis, The Continental Congress and Emerging
Ideas of Church–State Separation, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra 
note 17, at 180, 200–03 (examining the developing understanding of the sepa-
ration of church and state during the founding era that  understood the sepa-
ration not to foreclose all contact between religion and public life), with DANIEL
DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE 51–52 (2002) (wrongly equating “separation between 
church and state” with “religious influences separated from public life and pol-
icy.”  (emphasis original)) 
101. Although many of the private school voucher and tax programs chal-
lenge this principle by effectively allocating a large predominance of their 
funds to religious schools.  See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 
S. Ct. 2246, 2259 (2020); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002).
This is an issue that the Court should try to address.
102. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 526, 546–47, 534 (1993). 
103. Id. at 532.
104. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992).
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morality are necessary for a sound republic, and religion 
encourages both, as almost all of the Founders certainly believed, 
can government encourage religion generally while avoiding 
sectarianism?  Is separation inconsistent with morality in 
government?  Second, how can public officials act on their own 
religiosity?  Third, if government does sometimes seek to speak on 
religion, or in a religious voice, for example ceremonial deism or 
even declaration of a day of thanksgiving, what level of coercion to 
belief is necessary to prohibit such activity?  Fourth, can “religious 
freedom” justify an exception to an otherwise valid law? 
A. Virtue, Morality, and Religion
The Founders generally believed that to be successful a
republic required moral and virtuous citizens.  John Adams made 
the point using his nom de plume Novanglus: “[l]iberty can no more 
exist without virtue and independence, than the body can live and 
move without a soul.”105  Classic republican doctrine, recognizing 
the fragility of a republic, advocated for virtuous leaders.  “Talk of 
virtue was not so much pious cant,” Derek Davis explains; “it was a 
serious proposal to arrest the otherwise inevitable mortality of 
political society.  The success of the body politic would, the 
[Continental] Congress held, be dependent on the character of the 
people it comprised.”106 
Similarly, most of the Founders would have agreed that 
religion promoted such morality and virtue.  Perhaps the most 
commonly referenced statement of this idea is George Washington’s 
Farewell Address given when he stepped-down from the 
presidency: 
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political 
prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable 
supports.  In vain would that man claim the tribute of 
Patriotism, who should labour to subvert these great 
pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the 
duties of Men and Citizens. . . .  And let us with caution 
indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained 
without religion.  Whatever may be conceded to the 
105. Letter To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay (Feb. 6,
1775), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-02-
02-0072-0004 [https://perma.cc/FVF5-K4DW] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
106. Davis, supra note 100, at 194–95.
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influence of refined education on minds of peculiar 
structure; reason and experience both forbid us to expect 
that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious 
principle.107 
Those seeking to breach the wall of separation have reasoned that 
the republic needs virtue, religion encourages virtue, so 
government should encourage religion, and they claim the 
endorsement of the Founding generation.108  Washington’s address 
is offered as a “proof-text” for the need for government support of 
religion.109 
Many of the Founders, certainly Jefferson and Madison (and 
Washington), would disagree.  Jefferson and Madison “sought the 
total rejection of the time-honored precept that the good of both 
church and state required direct, statutory, and even financial 
support of some or all religious creeds or institutions, or required 
the diminishment or disadvantage of any other creed or 
institution[,]” Ralph Ketcham explains.110 
As a preliminary matter, to some extent the argument 
misreads Washington’s address.  Alexander Hamilton prepared a 
draft of the Address for Washington in which he suggested that the 
president expressly embrace government support for religion as a 
107. Washington’s Farewell Address, supra note 22.
108. See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 76 (citing JAMES H. HUTSON,
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 54–57 (2008)).  As 
Lupu and Tuttle explain: 
Earlier justifications for state funding of religion focused on the theo-
logical benefits of government care for the spiritual welfare of its sub-
jects.  For a variety of reasons, defenders of state aid for religion in 
the early eighteenth century shifted their argument to a political foot-
ing.  They claimed that support for an established faith was necessary 
to promote morality and good order.  
Id. 
109. Gunn, supra note 41, at 25.
110. Ketcham, supra note 69, at 171.  Ketcham goes on to recognize that, in
spite of support for separation, especially for Madison, “religion had a useful 
and important role to play generally in the realm of the political.”  Id. at 172. 
Ketcham concludes that there was an unstated “friendly neutrality toward and 
even encouragement of religions . . . [that] might be a worthy civic objective,” 
if not a government one.  Id. 
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means to promote virtue.111  Hamilton would have had Washington 
proclaim: “Does [national morality] not require the aid of a 
generally received and divinely authoritative [r]eligion?”112  
Washington rejected such an approach and deleted this portion of 
the address.113  While the Farewell Address urges the importance 
of religion to society, it does not support the idea of government 
supporting religion.  Ultimately, what Washington recommended 
in that section of the address was support for public 
education¾“[p]romote, then, as an object of primary importance, 
institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge[ ]”¾a  means to 
support virtue and morality without involving the government in 
religion.114  Jefferson made the same point about education and 
promotion of morality, telling John Adams that his bill for the 
General Diffusion of Knowledge (proposing a three-tiered system of 
public education) “would have raised the mass of the people to the 
high ground of moral respectability necessary to their own safety, 
& to orderly government.”115 
In this regard, Washington’s Farewell Address was not unlike 
similar provisions in the Northwest Ordinance.  That law, adopted 
by the Confederation Congress and readopted by the first Congress 
under the Constitution, declared that “[r]eligion, morality, and 
knowledge, [are] necessary to good government and the happiness 
of mankind,” but the Ordinance’s only call to government action in 
that context was that “schools and the means of education shall 
forever be encouraged.”116  Not unlike Washington’s removal of 
Hamilton’s suggestion of government support for religion, a 
provision specifically dedicating a parcel of government land in 
each district to the promotion of religion had been removed from 
111. Draft of Washington’s Farewell Address (July 30, 1796), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-20-02-0181-
0002 [https://perma.cc/38LB-A66K] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
112. Id.
113. Compare id. (including language supporting the connection of public
morality with religious institutions), with Washington’s Farewell Address, su-
pra note 22 (omitting language implying direct connection with established re-
ligion and morality); see also RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 159–60 (drawing same 
comparison). 
114. Washington’s Farewell Address, supra note 22.
115. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, supra note 55.
116. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. 3 (1787), https://ava-
lon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nworder.asp [https://perma.cc/PQX7-RX5U]. 
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the original draft of the Northwest Ordinance; government was to 
support education, but not religion.117  Madison was thrilled that 
the provision had been removed, writing to James Monroe 
incredulously: “How a regulation, so unjust in itself, so foreign to 
the Authority of Cong[res]s so hurtful to the sale of the public land, 
and smelling so strongly of an antiquated Bigotry, could have 
received the countenance of a Comm[it]tee is truly matter of 
astonishment.”118 
In the Cincinnati Bible case, the Ohio Supreme Court 
addressed this provision of the Northwest Ordinance specifically:  
[T]rue ‘religion’ and ‘morality’ are aided and promoted by
the increase and diffusion of ‘knowledge,’ . . . and that all
three—religion, morality, and knowledge—are essential to
good government. . . .  The truth is that these are matters
left to legislative discretion, subject to the limitations on
legislative power, regarding religious freedom, contained in
the bill of rights.119
As Andrew Seidel concludes, “[t]he Ordinance and farewell address 
mention religion as a societal necessity, not a government 
power.”120 
Setting aside Washington’s address, others in the Founding era 
argued more expressly that government support of religion was 
essential to protect morality and virtue.  For example, after the end 
of the Revolution, many leaders in Virginia advocated a general tax 
assessment to support Christian ministers and, as they defined it, 
the religion that was requisite to support morality and virtue.121  
Richard Henry Lee wrote to Madison that “the experience of all 
times shows Religion to be the guardian of morals—and he must be 
117. Letter From James Madison to James Monroe (May 29, 1785), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0156 
[perma.cc/T3CQ-2M98] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
118. Id.  In a rather lame citation of historic precedent, Justice Alito’s opin-
ion in American Legion v. American Humanist Association cites both Washing-
ton’s Farewell Address and the Northwest Ordinance, apparently as examples 
of support of legislative prayer, and ignores the fact that in both cases the pro-
posal for any government support of religion was excised.  139 S.Ct. 2067, 2087 
(2019) (plurality opinion), 
119. Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 244 (1872).
120. Seidel, supra note 43, at 319.
121. See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 77.
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a very inattentive observer in our Country, who does not see that 
avarice is accomplishing the destruction of religion, for want of a 
legal obligation to contribute something to its support.”122 
A number of Virginia’s citizens joined in the fight for the 
general religious assessment making similar arguments. 
Petitioners from Warwick County insisted that “it is essentially 
necessary for the good Government of all free states, that some 
legislative attention should be paid to religious Duties.”123  Religion 
is the “great safeguard against the corruption or usurpation of those 
who govern on the one hand; and the most powerful security for the 
subordination & obedience of those who are governed on the other,” 
urged supporters from Surry County, on December 1, 1784.124  A 
year later, petitioners from the same county argued that 
throughout the Christian world, “the political as well as religious 
effects of the Gospel have been thought worthy of Legislative 
attention.”125  Outside the context of the General Assessment, 
James Maury, one of Jefferson’s teachers, “explained that church 
and government had ‘such a close & mutual Dependence & 
connection with each other, & reciprocally give & receive such 
Stability & Support to & from each other, that they must 
necessarily stand or fall together.’”126 
Some Founders would have agreed.  Oliver Ellsworth, a 
delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, chaired a committee of the 
Connecticut legislature in 1802 concluding that as “peace, order 
and prosperity of society” are a government’s main object, 
“institutions for the promotion of good morals” are an appropriate 
object of legislative support, and “religious institutions are 
122. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to James Madison (Nov. 26, 1784),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-
0079 [perma.cc/JP23-XYMW] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).  In that letter Lee 
goes on to explain that “true freedom embraces the Mahomitan and the Gentoo 
as well as the Christian religion.”  Id. 
123. Petition from the Inhabitants of Warwick County to the House of Del-
egates of the Commonwealth of Virginia (May 15, 1784). 
124. Petition from the Inhabitants of Surry County to the House of Dele-
gates of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Dec. 1, 1784). 
125. Petition from the Inhabitants of Surry County to the House of Dele-
gates of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 14, 1785). 
126. TAYLOR, supra note 38, at 19 (quoting JAMES MAURY, TO CHRISTIANS OF
EVERY DENOMINATION AMONG US 31–32 (1771)). 
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eminently useful and important” in that regard.127  It is worth 
noting that Ellsworth’s support for such a program would have 
involved the most mild form of establishment¾a general support 
for religion only¾but an establishment nonetheless.128 
Michael McConnell notes generally that to the Founding 
generation’s “minds, republicanism both presupposed and 
demanded a degree of public virtue exceeding that required in 
monarchical regimes.”129  McConnell explores most specifically the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and its statement that 
government depends “upon piety, religion, and morality” and that 
these “cannot be generally diffused” without public support of 
worship and religious instruction; therefore, Massachusetts 
imposed a religious establishment130 (the last express religious 
establishment to be eliminated in the United States when it was 
overwhelmingly rejected by the people of Massachusetts in 
1833131).  While one might be hesitant to use this failed and vilified 
model as a precedent, McConnell notes that the arguments of 
Massachusetts Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons in Barnes v. First 
Parish132 give the most thorough explanation for the alleged need 
for church-state cooperation to promote virtue.133  
Parson’s recognized that the state needs people to obey moral 
duties beyond “the control of human legislation” (e.g., to promote 
charity, benevolence, relations between husbands, wives, and 
children).134  “The next step in Parsons’s argument was that the 
best way for the government to inculcate the civic virtue needed for 
community happiness is to support religion,” McConnell 
127. William R. Castro, Oliver Ellsworth’s Calvinist Vision of Church and
State in the Early Republic, in THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS ON RELIGION AND 
PUBLIC LIFE 65, 74 (Daniel L. Dreisbach, et al. eds., 2009).  See also GREEN, 
supra note 1, at 140–41. 
128. Castro, supra note 127, at 74.
129. McConnell, supra note 96, at 58.
130. Id. at 59 (quoting MASS. CONST. art. III (1780), reprinted in MICHAEL
W. MCCONNEL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 33–34 (2d ed. 2002)).
131. See Nathan S. Rives, “Is Not This a Paradox?”: Public Morality and the
Unitarian Defense of State-Supported Religion in Massachusetts, 86 NEW ENG. 
Q. 232, 232–33 (2013).
132. Barnes v. Inhabitants of First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. 401 (1810).
133. McConnell, supra note 96, at 60.
134. Id. at 61 (quoting Barnes, 6 Mass. at 405).
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concludes.135  “That is a far more troubling claim from our modern 
disestablishmentarian point of view.  But throughout most of 
history, religious teaching has been one of the most powerful means 
of inculcation of ideas of morality.”136  McConnell poses the 
question: “Who was right? Jefferson or Parsons?”137  Of course, even 
if one concludes that Parsons (who was supporting the policy that 
was overwhelmingly defeated by the people of Massachusetts in 
1833) was more correct than Jefferson and Madison at the time, 
that begs the question of whether support for religion is still 
necessary to protect morality. 
Among the problems with Parson’s approach from a 
Jeffersonian perspective, however, is whether government support 
for religion is the best means to promote religion (and, thus, the 
best means to promote virtue, even if one otherwise accepts the 
argument’s logic).  Many others during the Founding era grappled 
directly with the issue of morality and virtue in government and 
rejected even the mildest form of establishment or any government 
support for religion.  Indeed, the effort to impose a general 
assessment for these purposes in Virginia, an example used by 
those advocating government support for religion, was 
overwhelmed by opposition from evangelicals and allies of Jefferson 
and Madison, and the evangelicals not only rejected the tax but 
135. Id.
136. Id. at 61–62.  While this is undoubtedly true as a historic matter, it
does not rise to the level of necessity.  For example, modern law and education 
have found ways to encourage charities and sound familial relations without 
resorting to a government-sanctioned religion. 
137. Id. at 61.  McConnell concedes, somewhat apologetically, that Parsons’
arguments are expressly restricted to Christianity, but insists that this is 
merely a recognition that it was long-standing, “had long been promulgated,” 
and was “well known” to Parsons.  Id. at 62.  McConnell urges that the point 
for Parsons was not that government would endorse the view that Christianity 
“was actually true . . . .  [T]ruth was not a necessary element in his justification 
for the establishment.”  Id.  This is too kind.  Massachusetts specifically re-
stricted its establishment to Christianity, and Parsons insisted that its “divine 
authority [is] admitted” and it has been “found to rest on the basis of immortal 
truth”  Id. (quoting Barnes, 6 Mass. at 406).  As others have pointed out, virtu-
ally all politicians who encourage government support for religious “truth” ar-
gue that it is their religion that carries such truth.  See, e.g., Bill for Establish-
ing Religious Freedom, supra note 60  (“[T]he impious presumption of 
legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but 
fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others, 
setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and in-
fallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on others . . . .”).  
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repeatedly addressed the broader issue and concluded that 
government could promote morality and virtue without intervening 
in religion.  In fact, government intervention “in support” of religion 
would do more harm than good for religion.  During the legislative 
debates over the general assessment, Madison framed the question 
thus: “[The t]rue question [is] not—Is Rel[igion]: neces[sar]y? [But] 
are Relig[iou]s Estab[lishmen]ts. necess[ar]y for Religion?”138 
Perhaps the most telling analysis in this regard came from the 
Hanover Presbytery, representing the Presbyterians of Virginia.  In 
1784, the year that the general assessment was proposed, the 
Presbyterian clergy wrote a petition somewhat grudgingly 
supporting a non-discriminatory assessment to fund ministers in 
what the author of that petition (Samuel Stanhope Smith, a future 
president of New Jersey College) argued was the mildest 
manner.139  Referring to religion, the petition explained: 
Neither is it necessary to their existence that they should 
be publicly supported by a legal provision for the purpose, 
as tried experience hath often shown; although it is 
absolutely necessary to the existence & welfare of every 
political combination of men in society, to have the support 
of Religion and its solemn institutions as affecting the 
conduct of rational beings more than human laws can 
possibly do.  On this Account it is wise policy in Legislation 
to seek its alliance & solicit it’s [sic] aid in a civil view 
because of it’s [sic] happy influence upon the morality of the 
citizens, and its tendency to preserve the veneration of an 
oath or an appeal to heaven, which is the cement of the 
social Union.  It is upon this principle alone in our opinion, 
that a Legislative body has a right to interfere in Religion 
at all, & of consequence we suppose that this interference 
ought only to extend to the preserving of the public worship 
of the Deity, and the supporting of Institutions for 
138. Madison’s Notes for Debates on the General Assessment Bill (Dec.
1784), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-
08-02-0104-0003 [https://perma.cc/U4V4-5ZMF] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
139. See Smylie, supra note 78, at 360, 369.
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inculcating the great fundamental principles of all Religion 
without which Society could not easily exist.140 
Even with these caveats, the Presbytery insisted that the 
assessment had to be made on the “most liberal” plan possible, 
including non-discrimination.141  This Presbyterian petition, while 
insisting that religion does not need government aid, provides 
support for the type of generic encouragement of religion advocated 
by Parsons, McConnell, and others, albeit insisting on non-
discrimination.  
The debate, though, did not stop there.  After this petition was 
released, Presbyterians across the state were enraged with even 
that lukewarm endorsement of government intervention in matters 
of religion, even in the name of virtue and morality.  Instead, they 
rejected any government support of religion and did so most 
emphatically, forcing the clergy who had supported the original 
petition to recede.142  One year after the above-quoted petition, the 
Presbytery went on record: “We oppose the Bill, Because it is a 
Departure from the proper line of Legislation; Because it is 
unnecessary, & inadequate to its professed end¾impolitic.”143  The 
Presbytery agreed that there is a “happy influence of Christianity” 
on the nation, but insisted that it was never so effectual in 
encouraging morality and virtue as when left alone, free from all 
government interference.144  Echoing the theological arguments in 
favor of a strict separation, the Presbytery explained that 
involvement of the civil power in religion was “destructive of 
genuine morality.”145 
Petitions from around Virginia made the same point, focusing 
directly on the argument in favor of morality and virtue and 
140. Petition from the Hanover Presbytery to the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Virginia (November 12, 1784). 
141. Id.
142. See Smylie, supra note 78, at 359; RAGOSTA, supra note 12, at 121–27.
143. Petition from Presbyterian Ministers to the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 2, 1785); see also Smylie, supra note 78, at 
370. 
144. Petition from Presbyterian Ministers, supra note 143.
145. Id.  McConnell cross-references the 1784 Hanover Presbytery’s support
of a general assessment in his argument in support of some government sup-
port of religion, see McConnell, supra note 96, at 59, the same petition that was 
overwhelming rejected in 1785, see RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 86–87. 
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insisting that the government could support morality and virtue 
without supporting religion, even in a very general manner: 
• Botetourt County, November 29, 1785:
Civil Government and Religion are, and ought to be,
independent of each other.  The one has for its object a
proper Regulation of the external conduct of men toward
each other, . . . the other has for its object our internal or
spiritual welfare & is beyond the reach of human laws . . . .
[Prior] to the revelation of the Christian Religion . . .
Roman and Grecian governments [were] founded upon the
principles of Justice and equality [and] produced in the
citizens the encouraged virtues.146
• Powhatan County, Baptist Associations, November 3,
1785:
[We] are of opinion that the Church as a Spiritual body, has
a polity of its own intirely [sic] distinct from and
independent of all combinations of Men for Civil purposes
. . . .  And as they think [the] Legislature will have
sufficiently done its part in favour of Christianity when
adequate provision is made for supporting those Laws of
Morality, which are necessary for private and public
happiness and of which it seems more properly the
Guardian than of the peculiarities of the Christian
Church.147
• Chesterfield County, November 14, 1785: “[B]ut it’s said to
be Necessary to unite the Church and State to keep men
moral and for to have confidence in an Oath we Humbly
146. Petition from the Inhabitants of Botetourt County to the General As-
sembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 29, 1785), http://www.vir-
giniamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX] [Edi-
tors Note: all petitions are available through the virginia memory website 
search engine but we are unable to provide url permalinks to the specific peti-
tions being cited in footnotes 146–51.]. 
147. Petition from the Inhabitants of Powhatan County Baptist Associa-
tions to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 3, 1785), 
http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PM-
BAAX]. 
580 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.26:545 
conceive the civil magistrate has a right to punish 
Immorality so far as society is injured there by.”148 
• Brunswick County, November 9, 1785: “Let laws punish
the vices and immoralities of the time . . . .  Let ministers
manifest to the world that they are Inwardly moved by the
Holy Ghost.”149
• Montgomery County, November 15, 1785: “Good morals
are essential to civil society, but no indication that civil
laws are not adequate to that purpose.  Right and wrong
can be derived from positive law, without seeking higher
[religious] authority.”150
• Mecklenburg County, December 24, 1784: “We think every
man ought to be left free from all compulsion in this
matter, except that of their own Reason & Conscience; This
we apprehend will be Best both for Church, & State.”151
In his Memorial & Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments, Madison agreed, explaining that religion (and its 
social utility) did not need any government support: 
148. Petition from the Inhabitants of Chesterfield County to the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 14, 1785), http://www.vir-
giniamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX].  The 
Chesterfield petitioners went on to insist that civil laws should “let Jews, Me-
hometans [sic], and Christians of every Denomination injoy [sic] religious lib-
erty, . . . .  [F]ind their advantage in living under your laws [because] religion 
is of god to man [as] the Civil law is of you to your people[,] . . . .  [A]nd let the 
Church of Christ and religion alone.”  Id. 
149. Petition from the Inhabitants of Brunswick County to the General As-
sembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 9, 1785), http://www.vir-
giniamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX]. A 
number of similar “Spirit of the Gospel” petitions were filed. 
150. Petition from the Inhabitants of Montgomery County to the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 15, 1785), http://www.vir-
giniamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX]. 
151. Petition from the Inhabitants of Mecklenburg County to the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Dec. 24, 1785), http://www.vir-
giniamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX].  See 
also Petition from the Inhabitants of Amelia County to the General Assembly 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 9, 1785); Petition from the Inhabitants 
of Caroline County to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
(Oct. 27, 1785), http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions 
[https://perma.cc/U2PM-BAAX]. 
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Because the establishment proposed by the Bill is not 
requisite for the support of the Christian Religion.  To say 
that it is, is a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself, 
for every page of it disavows a dependence on the powers of 
this world: it is a contradiction to fact; for it is known that 
this Religion both existed and flourished, not only without 
the support of human laws, but in spite of every opposition 
from them, and not only during the period of miraculous 
aid, but long after it had been left to its own evidence and 
the ordinary care of Providence.  Nay, it is a contradiction 
in terms; for a Religion not invented by human policy, must 
have pre-existed and been supported, before it was 
established by human policy.152  
Madison warned explicitly of the dangers posed to religion from 
government support: 
It is moreover to weaken in those who profess this Religion 
a pious confidence in its innate excellence and the 
patronage of its Author; and to foster in those who still 
reject it, a suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its 
fallacies to trust it to its own merits.153 
Years later Madison explained again why government support of 
religion was not necessary for support of morality and virtue:  
The settled opinion here is that . . . there are causes in the 
human breast, which ensure the perpetuity of religion 
without the aid of the law; that rival sects, with equal 
rights, exercise mutual censorships in favor of good morals; 
that if new sects arise with absurd opinions or overheated 
imaginations, the proper remedies lie in time, forbearance 
and example.154 
On the force of these arguments, and thousands of signatures 
of Jeffersonians and evangelicals, the General Assessment was 
152. Madison, supra note 94.
153. Id.
154. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Mar. 19, 1823), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-03-02-0015 
[https://perma.cc/4JEA-W57C] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
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defeated.155  At the time, most viewed the proposed assessment as 
precisely the type of general support of religion that is now 
advocated by many of those opposed to a wall of separation.156  Of 
course, one might argue that while such a tax is inappropriate, a 
general support of religion by government endorsement is still 
required to encourage morality and virtue; the arguments 
referenced above are wholly applicable to even such a limited 
scheme. 
 One of the reasons why government support of religion was 
seen as unnecessary by Jefferson and Madison was their view that 
all religions and philosophies tend to support similar ethical 
regimes, i.e., similar concepts of morality and virtue.  The 
universality of such doctrines draws into question the need for 
government support for religion. In Jefferson’s view: 
Every religion consists of moral precepts & of dogmas.  [I]n 
the first they all agree . . . .  [A]nd these are the articles 
necessary for preservation of order, justice, & happiness in 
society. [I]n their particular dogmas [they] all differ[ ] . . . . 
& [these are] unimportant to the legitimate objects of 
society.157 
He reflected that, on the religious side of a disestablishment society: 
Religion is well supported; of various kinds, indeed, but all 
good enough; all sufficient to preserve peace and order: or 
if a sect arises, whose tenets would subvert morals, good 
sense has fair play, and reasons and laughs it out of doors, 
without suffering the state to be troubled with it.158  
And, on the secular side: 
Man was destined for society.  His morality therefore was 
to be formed to this object.  He was endowed with a sense 
155. See Carl H. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent and the Virginia Disestablish-
ment, 1776–1786, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 51, 86 (2009); RAGOSTA, supra note 
1, 89–90. 
156. See Susan Jacoby, The White House is Tearing Down the Wall Between
Church and State, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/07/05/opinion/sunday/church-state-supreme-court-reli-
gion.html [perma.cc/WZ9Y-SFBQ]. 
157. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Fishback (Draft), supra note
58. 
158. See JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 161.
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of right and wrong merely relative to this.  This sense is as 
much a part of his nature as the sense of hearing, seeing, 
feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the 
truth . . . as fanciful writers have imagined.  The moral 
sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or 
arm. 
. . .  If [your inquiry] ends in a belief that there is no god, 
you will find incitements to virtue in the comfort and 
pleasantness you feel in it’s [sic] exercise, and the love of 
others which it will procure you.159 
Thomas Paine said the same: “[a]ll religions are in their nature 
mild and benign, and united with principles of morality.”160  While 
Jefferson agreed that virtue was necessary in a republic, he 
concluded that, given the universality of moral principles, 
government need not intervene to promote religion.161  
Indeed, government support would be counterproductive; 
mixing church and state, as many of the evangelicals had noted, 
would corrupt both.  Madison told one correspondent that “[t]he 
settled opinion here is that religion is essentially distinct from Civil 
Gov[ernmen]t and exempt from its cognizance; that a connexion 
[sic] between them is injurious to both.”162  Madison explained this 
point at length: 
159. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, supra note 66.
160. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 80 (1791).
161. See generally Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller (Jan. 23,
1808), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-
01-02-7257 [perma.cc/5XW6-TCBR] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).  Madison, dur-
ing the debates over ratification of the Constitution, underscored this point:
I go on this great principle, that the people will have virtue and intel-
ligence to select men of virtue and wisdom.  Is there no virtue among 
us?  If there be not, we are in a wretched situation.  No theoretical 
checks, no form of government, can render us secure.  To suppose that 
any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any 
virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.  
James Madison, Judicial Powers of the National Government (June 20, 1788), 
NAT’L ARCHVIES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-
0101 [https://perma.cc/4XUA-65M9] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).  John Adams 
also recognized that the Constitution was made for a moral/virtuous people, 
but as Derek Davis notes, “not to produce them.  The responsibility for virtuous 
character must rest with the people.”  Davis, supra note 100, at 196 (emphasis 
in original). 
162. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett, supra note 154.
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Notwithstanding the general progress made within the two 
last Centuries in favor of this branch of liberty [religious 
freedom], and the full establishment of it, in some parts of 
our Country, there remains in others, a strong bias towards 
the old error, that without some sort of alliance or coalition 
between Government & Religion, neither can be duly 
supported.  Such indeed is the tendency to such a Coalition, 
and such its corrupting influence on both the parties, that 
the danger can not be too carefully guarded against . . . .  
Religion & Gov[ernmen]t will both exist in greater purity, 
the less they are mixed together.  It was the belief of all 
Sects at one time that the establishment of Religion by law 
was right & necessary; that the true Religion ought to be 
established in exclusion of all others; and that the only 
question to be decided was, which was the true Religion 
. . . .  I can not speak particularly of any of the cases 
excepting that of Virginia, where it is impossible to deny 
that Religion prevails with more zeal, and a more 
exemplary priesthood, than it ever did when established 
and patronized by Public authority.  We are teaching the 
World the great truth, that Governments do better without 
Kings & Nobles than with them.  The merit will be doubled 
by the other lesson, that Religion flourishes in greater 
purity, without than with the aid of Government.163 
Jefferson had said the same in the preamble to the Statute for 
Establishing Religious Freedom: government support for religion 
“tends also to corrupt the principles of that very religion it is meant 
to encourage, by bribing, with a monopoly of worldly honours and 
emoluments, those who will externally profess and conform to 
it.”164 
When Jefferson was attacked for his alleged atheism by 
political opponents, Jeffersonians made the same point.  During the 
presidential campaign of 1800, Tunis Wortman, a New York 
Democratic-Republican, explained in A Solemn Address to 
Christians and Patriots: 
163. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-02-
0471 [perma.cc/44H4-CCX9] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
164. Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 60.
2021] IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION? 585 
Religion and government are equally necessary, but their 
interests should be kept separate and distinct.  No 
legitimate connection can ever subsist between them. 
Upon no plan, no system, can they become united, without 
endangering the purity and usefulness of both¾the church 
will corrupt the state, and the state pollute the church.165 
One of the key means of corruption, if government sought to 
support religion, would be the use of religion by politicians to 
promote their own political interests at the expense of the people (a 
concern with particular resonance today as “Court Evangelicals” 
surround former President Trump in a mutual quest for power 
(rather than grace)166).  Madison identified such corruption of 
religion as another problem with the proposed General Assessment. 
Government support:  
[I]mplies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent
Judge of Religious Truth; or that he may employ Religion
as an engine of Civil policy.  The first is an arrogant
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers
in all ages, and throughout the world: the second an
unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation.
. . . . 
. . . What influence in fact have ecclesiastical 
establishments had on Civil Society?  In some instances 
they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the 
ruins of the Civil authority; in many instances they have 
been seen upholding the thrones of political tyranny: in no 
instance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties 
of the people.  Rulers who wished to subvert the public 
liberty, may have found an established Clergy convenient 
auxiliaries.  A just Government instituted to secure & 
perpetuate it needs them not.  Such a Government will be 
best supported by protecting every Citizen in the 
165. TUNIS WORTMAN, A SOLEMN ADDRESS TO CHRISTIANS AND PATRIOTS
(1800), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 
1730-1805, 1479, 1488 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d ed. 1998). 
166. See, e.g., John Fea, Courtiers and Kings, Evangelicals, Prophets and
Trump, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://religionnews.com/2020/
01/08/courtiers-and-kings-evangelicals-prophets-and-trump/ [perma.cc/3PQ3-
4ZAL]. 
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enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which 
protects his person and his property; by neither invading 
the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to 
invade those of another.167 
In the preamble to the Statute, Jefferson explained: 
[Allowing a] civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the 
field of opinion and to restrain the profession or 
propagation of principles on supposition of their ill 
tendency is a dangerous falacy [sic], which at once destroys 
all religious liberty, because he being of course judge of that 
tendency will make his opinions the rule of judgment, and 
approve or condemn the sentiments of others only as they 
shall square with or differ from his own.168  
Religious leaders had made the same point.  Reverend Elisha 
Williams, in The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants, 
noted wryly that “a religious establishment made by the civil 
authority which they think is agre[e]able to the scriptures is 
certainly agre[e]able to them.”169  More generally, as Ira Lupu and 
Robert Tuttle of George Washington University School of Law note, 
“nonestablishment also reduces religious groups’ incentive to 
compete for political supremacy.  If the machinery of government 
may not be used to support or promote any faith, religious groups 
will find control of government significantly less valuable.”170  
Michael McConnell made a similar point: “Establishment was not 
really about religion; it was about government control over the 
formation of public opinion.  And disestablishment was not an 
attempt to curtail the influence or prominence of religion in public 
life.  It was to make religious practice free and independent, and 
therefore strong.”171  While McConnell argues that this can be 
167. Madison, supra note 94.
168. Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 60.
169. ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF
PROTESTANTS (1744), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, 53, 75 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d ed. 1998). 
170. LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 23.
171. McConnell, supra note 96, at 65.
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accomplished while still permitting generic government support for 
religion, Jefferson and Madison disagreed.172 
Jefferson and Madison were quite clear that government 
involvement would not promote religion, rather it would undermine 
it.173  In a free market of religion, in contrast, religion, truth, and 
virtue would all benefit, and, as noted above, building a wall of 
separation in fact led to an explosion in American religion in the 
Second Great Awakening.174  John Witte concludes that the 
realization that religion (and, thus, its impact on virtue and 
morality) would be strongest without any government assistance is 
the most original American insight.175 
Some would argue that the use of legislative chaplains is a 
subset of this effort to have government encourage virtue and 
morality.  I will not here engage fully the question of the 
constitutionality of chaplains, although the cases regarding 
chaplains have certainly been full of bad history.  Others have 
explored the issue extensively.176  Several observations are in order 
in this context, however: First, the hiring of legislative chaplains 
had been justified largely as a historic exception since Marsh,177 
based on some very weak history.178  For example, the Court 
172. See supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text.  A distinction needs to
be made between government support of religion qua religion and support of 
religion indirectly and in a neutral manner.  Thus, Jefferson and Madison (and 
the Supreme Court) would see an enormous difference in a government tax 
system that promoted contributions to charities, including religious institu-
tions, and a tax system that promoted contributions to religious institutions 
but not to other charities.  Cf. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 
2246, 2254 (2020) (“We have repeatedly held that the Establishment Clause is 
not offended when religious observers and organizations benefit from neutral 
government programs.”  (citations omitted)). 
173. See supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
175. Witte, supra note 43, at 12.
176. See generally George R. Kennedy, God(s) in Congress, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1731 (2013); Andy G. Olree, James Madison and Legislative Chaplains, 102 
NW. UNI. L. REV., 145 (2008); Richard D. Rosen, Katcoff v. Marsh at Twenty-
Two: The Military Chaplaincy and the Separation of Church and State, 38 UNI. 
TOL. L. REV. 1137 (2007); Seidel, supra note 43, passim. 
177. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
178. See Seidel, supra note 43, passim.  I hate the term “law office history”:
good lawyers do not use bad history.  The Marsh Court upheld legislative chap-
lains “almost exclusively on the precedent of First Congress.”  GREEN, supra 
note 1, at 13.  For example, in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 
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ignored Madison’s statements that legislative chaplains were 
unconstitutional and that such deviant precedent should not be 
relied upon.179  
Now, in American Legion, the Court plurality has eschewed the 
common view that Marsh was based on a historic exception180 in 
favor of an analysis of the First Amendment based on “a history and 
tradition test.”181  This is a far more expansive and flexible doctrine 
and, divorced from principle, makes little sense and poses 
considerable danger.  For example, will the Sedition Act now be a 
precedent for free speech?  In the Jim Crow era, where will we look 
for “history and tradition” concerning the Equal Protection, Due 
Process, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses?  This approach 
also seems to ignore change over time: Given that the states were 
not bound by the First Amendment initially, how they adapted their 
systems to religious freedom is probably more informative of how 
(1987), while discussing Marsh, the Court explained that: “The Court based its 
conclusion in that case on the historical acceptance of the practice.  Such a 
historical approach is not useful in determining the proper roles of church and 
state in public schools, since free public education was virtually nonexistent at 
the time the Constitution was adopted.”  But see LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 
43, at 144 (while Marsh could be read as a narrow, historic ruling, Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), only a year later, upends that limitation by 
granting leniency to government actions without any founding era analogy). 
Some indication of the Court’s somewhat hollow attempt to treat Marsh as a 
historic anomaly was evident in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 
(2014), where the Court stated that “Marsh must not be understood as permit-
ting a practice that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its 
historical foundation” despite expanding legislative prayer beyond even its du-
bious historical moorings. 
179. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 807 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  “Rather than let
this step beyond the landmarks of power have the effect of a legitimate prece-
dent, it will be better to apply to it the aphorism de minimis non curat lex: or 
to class it ‘cum maculis quas aut incuria fudit, aut humana parum cavit 
natura.’”  James Madison, Detached Memoranda (Jan. 31, 1820), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-01-02-0549 
[perma.cc/M4EL-PA9T] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021) [hereinafter Detached 
Memoranda].  “I shall also take notice of one thing which appears to me uncon-
stitutional, . . . [by that] I mean the thing of paying the chaplains of the civil 
and military departments out of the public treasury. . . .  If legislatures choose 
to have a chaplain, for Heaven’s sake let them pay him by contributions, and 
not out of the public chest.”  LELAND, supra note 22, at 119. 
180. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087 (2019) (plu-
rality opinion). 
181. See id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  But see id. at 2091
(Breyer, J., concurring) (rejecting a “history and tradition test”). 
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they perceived the First Amendment (and the growth of a unique 
American religious freedom) than their practice at its 
adoption¾“history and tradition.”182 
Second, much of the work on chaplains ignores the fact that the 
hiring of a legislative chaplain was initially about preaching to 
legislators.183  Inward looking preaching to government members 
(who choose to attend) is very different from outward proselytizing 
at public meetings that citizens attend for a multiplicity of 
reasons.184  This distinction has broader implications, and were it 
enforced as a requirement¾for example, requiring that any such 
prayers before governmental meetings be addressed to members, 
possibly having such prayers privately preceding public meetings, 
etc.,—it would resolve much of the controversy concerning 
government chaplains.185  
Third, with respect to military chaplains, they were obviously 
intended to preach to military members, not to proselytize publicly.  
Madison recognized that in preaching to service members, military 
chaplains may be different from other government chaplains: When 
people are removed from normal access to ministers, their rights of 
free exercise might otherwise be implicated.186  But, this means 
that one must distinguish preaching to troops at wholly voluntary 
services or counseling with troops (again, voluntary) and public 
appearances by military chaplains.  At a minimum, such use of 
182. Certainly, state developments in the area of religious freedom are
highly relevant vis-à-vis the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Cf. 
RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 132–68 (discussing state constitutional develop-
ments through the Supreme Court’s decision concerning the meaning of the 
First Amendment in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878)). 
183. See Galloway, 572 U.S. at 575 (framing legislative prayer as a neutral
acknowledgement of religion and reminder for legislators to work toward the 
common good). 
184. Cf. id. at 576–78 (noting import of voluntary participation).
185. See id.  One also suspects that officials would be far less interested in
these prayers if they did not occur in public, thereby giving them the ability to 
enlist profanely the imprimatur of religion for their own political purposes. 
186. See Detached Memoranda, supra note 179 (expressing sympathy for
chaplains in a military context but concern that their use would be a justifica-
tion for government chaplains in other contexts); see also Sch. Dist.of Abington 
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting 
that some objectionable government practices might be permissible in the pe-
numbra between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses including, 
“[p]rovisions for churches and chaplains at military establishments”). 
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chaplains should be subject to all of the relevant restrictions: a 
neutral choice of ministers, no proselytizing, and a clear indication 
that religion is not “endorsed.”187  
Finally, it is worth noting a growing problem with the theory 
that the Founders would have accepted government support for 
religion generally while eschewing support for any particular 
religion, a problem resulting from the growing religious diversity of 
the nation.  Can government encourage religion generally, while 
avoiding sectarianism?  Proposals for “generic” support for religion 
would have difficulty addressing growing nontraditional religions, 
from Buddhism, to Taoism, to Hinduism, to Sikhism, much less 
Rastafarianism, Druidism, Wicca, the Jedi Religion, Pastafarians, 
etc. 
Some conservative justices have sought to avoid this problem 
by creating a new theory that would allow the government to 
promote some, but not all, religions, what has historically been seen 
as a complete anathema to the First Amendment: 
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be 
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and 
practice.  It may not be hostile to any religion or to the 
advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or 
promote one religion or religious theory against another or 
even against the militant opposite.  The First Amendment 
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and 
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.188  
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist and 
Thomas, openly advocated the idea that only monotheist religions, 
specifically Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, are fully protected by 
the First Amendment, enjoying a special privilege of government 
endorsement.189  Based on a rather distorted view of history, Scalia 
reasoned that supporting these religions, all of which endorse the 
Ten Commandments and accept (at least in part) the Bible as true 
187. See, e.g., Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565.  It is difficult for the govern-
ment not to “endorse” religion when the person praying is in uniform¾as army 
regulations, discussed below, recognize.  See infra notes 228–30 and accompa-
nying text. 
188. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968) (citing a long list of
precedent). 
189. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893–94 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). 
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revelation, was consistent with the Founders’ expectations.190  It is 
worth noting that even Scalia would agree that the Establishment 
Clause still prevents the government from directly funding these 
religions.191  
As a preliminary matter, this is an odd position for a textualist 
to take; there is certainly no support in the text of the Constitution 
for singling out particular religions for special treatment, and, as I 
have shown elsewhere, many in the Founding generation were 
aware of non-monotheistic religions that shared the protections of 
religious freedom.192  Nor is there any basis in early American 
history for combining Christianity, Judaism, and Islam for 
preferred treatment.193  This focus on monotheism is part of a 
history of revisionism by those seeking to encourage church-state 
cooperation and breach Jefferson’s wall.  What was originally 
“Christian preferentialism”¾government could support 
Christianity generally but not any individual sect¾morphed into 
“Judeo-Christian preferentialism” after the atrocities of World War 
II made it simply politically unacceptable to exclude Jews; the term 
“Judeo-Christian” was not one that eighteenth-century Founders 
would have recognized.194  Thus, if one wants to rely on the 
Founders’ views, broadly defined, on “acceptable” religions to 
190. See id. at 909.
191. As others have pointed out, there is little reason for Scalia’s conclusion
that neutrality vis-à-vis different religions and religions versus irreligion ap-
plies to Free Exercise and affirmative funding of religion but does not apply to 
endorsement¾other than the fact that this achieves the result sought by con-
servatives by in each instance effectively promoting the religion of the major-
ity.  See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Jus-
tice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment 
Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1117 (2006).  In concluding that almost all 
Americans endorse the Ten Commandments, Scalia ignores not only the sig-
nificant differences in different religion’s versions of the Ten Commandments, 
but the tens of millions of Americans who do not fall within his preferred list 
of religions.  Id. at 1119. 
192. See id. at 1131.
193. See, e.g., James Loeffler, The Problem With the ‘Judeo-Christian Tra-
dition,’ ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2020/08/the-judeo-christian-tradition-is-over/614812/ [https://perma.cc/2UFJ-
BHYX]. 
194. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 151–53 (discussing how members of the
Court have used deeply misleading partial quotations and citations to morph 
the Christian preferentialism advocated by some in the early nineteenth cen-
tury into Judeo-Christian preferentialism). 
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promote, inclusion of Judaism would be problematic.  Scalia and his 
cohort have now sought to morph the concept again into 
monotheists in a “politically correct” effort to include Muslims.195  
Setting aside the historic problems with the proposal, it would 
enflame sectarian controversies¾something that separation of 
church and state was intended to alleviate¾and tend to protect the 
majority at the expense of the minority¾another position that flies 
in the face of the purposes of the First Amendment.196   Others have 
discussed this proposal at length,197 the point here is that it is 
another effort to avoid the problems that would be created were the 
195. See Colby, supra note 191, at 1118.  If one wanted to limit protections
to the common “religion” at the time of the founding, that would exclude Juda-
ism, Islam, and arguably Catholicism (and then courts would face the question 
of what to do with “new” Christian sects that were arguably outside the under-
standing at the Founding, e.g., Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, etc.  Com-
pare Audrey Barrick, Devout Mormon Declares: I’m Not a Christian, CHRISTIAN
POST (June 14, 2012), https://www.christianpost.com/news/devout-mormon-de-
clares-im-not-a-christian-76694/ [perma.cc/XB9M-U2Y9] (distinguishing Mor-
mons from “mainline” Christian sects), with New Poll on Religion and the Elec-
tion 2012: Romney’s Mormon Faith Likely a Factor in Primaries, Not in a 
General Election, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 23, 2011), https://www.pewfo-
rum.org/2011/11/23/new-poll-on-religion-and-the-election-2012/ 
[https://perma.cc/9D93-KRL3] (noting that many White evangelical voters do 
not consider Mormonism a Christian faith).  Leaving these decisions up to 
courts poses another set of problems.  The problem is even evident in the Ten 
Commandment cases since various denominations and religions use signifi-
cantly different versions of the Ten Commandments.  Justice Scalia, in arguing 
that the government can erect Ten Commandment monuments, at the same 
time argues that the government cannot engage in the argument about which 
version is the most “authentic” or to be preferred¾but the erection of a monu-
ment, by choosing a particular version, effectively does just that.  See Colby, 
supra note 191, at 1108 n.35.  Colby explains further that for Scalia, govern-
ment invocation of “God” is not an establishment, but invocation of Vishnu, 
Zeus, or polytheism is.  Id. at 1110–11. 
196. See id. at 1119.
197. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable
Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1587–90 (2010) (official acknowl-
edgement of majoritarian Judeo-Christian religion creates an atmosphere that 
alienates minority groups); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: 
The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 514–15 (1986) 
(noting that promoting majoritarian religious practices as “secularized” due to 
their long history in American society disadvantages religions that have more 
recently developed or arrived); Gary J. Simson, Laws Intentionally Favoring 
Mainstream Religions: An Unhelpful Comparison to Race, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
514, 515–16 (1994) (critiquing Establishment Clause theories that would ad-
vantage certain religions).  
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government to be allowed to promote religion generally¾an 
increasingly complex and ill-defined group¾in an effort to 
encourage virtue and morality. 
None of this, though, changes the fact that the Founders, while 
wishing to end state support for religion, certainly expected that 
officials would be virtuous and moral officials.  That, though, raises 
the question of how such officials should exercise their religion. 
B. Public Officials/Religious People
Whatever the restrictions imposed on the government in terms
of promotion of religion, there was a broad anticipation at the 
founding that the American people, including those who would hold 
government office, would be a religious people.  The same is true 
today (although less so than in the past for the reasons noted at the 
outset).  It is notable, for example, that even while the share of 
Americans who profess to be Christian or religious is declining 
substantially, the share of elected officials identifying as Christian 
is overwhelming.  The Pew Research Center, for example, notes 
that over 88% of the U.S. Congress identifies as Christian, 
compared to a national average of 71% of U.S. adults being 
Christian.198  High-ranking Trump administration officials were 
likely even more heavily weighted to Christianity.199  While the 
Civil Service may have a religious demographic that more closely 
parallels the national average, this still begs a question: What can 
a person who happens to be religious and happens to be an official 
do about their religiosity on the “government side of the wall”? 
Once again, Jefferson grappled with this issue, particularly in 
the context of national prayer proclamations.  Both of Jefferson’s 
predecessors as president had issued prayer proclamations, as had 
Jefferson as governor when directed to do so by the legislature.200  
During the run-up to the Revolution, Jefferson had joined with 
other members of the Virginia House of Burgesses to urge a day of 
fasting and prayer in support of Boston after that port was closed 
198. Faith on the Hill, The religious composition of the 116th Congress, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/2019/01/03/faith-on-
the-hill-116/ [perma.cc/TSB8-8AN6]. 
199. This is not surprising; a majority will tend to dominate elections.  It is,
though, another example of why it is so important that civil liberties protect 
minorities; majorities tend to be protected through the legislative process. 
200. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 189, 266 n.43.
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by Britain as part of the Intolerable Acts.201  Notably, though, 
Jefferson would later report that he and a group of political radicals 
had “cooked up” that declaration for its political effect, the type of 
use of religion by politicians that he came to rail against.202  Of 
course, there was no First Amendment at that time and Virginia 
had not yet adopted the Statute for Establishing Religious 
Freedom.203 
As president, though, Jefferson understood that he was subject 
to the prohibitions of the First Amendment Establishment 
Clause.204  With that in mind, even when the country was faced 
with the crisis of hundreds of sailors being impressed by the British 
navy, and with the prospect of what would prove to be a devastating 
embargo hanging over the nation, Jefferson insisted that it would 
violate the Constitution for the president to call officially for a 
201. Id. at 189.
202. Id. at 193.  In spite of the “cooked up” comment, some commentators
continue to insist that Jefferson’s authorship of the prayer proclamation is ev-
idence of his sincere religious commitment, but Jefferson told Daniel Webster 
that he and his colleagues had to get someone else to introduce the resolution 
because “[i]t would hardly have been in character for us to present them our-
selves.”  DANIEL WEBSTER, Notes of Mr. Jefferson’s Conversation, 1824 at Mon-
ticello, in 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, CORRESPONDENCE, 1798–1824, at 
370, 374 (Charles M. Wiltse & Harold D. Moser eds., Univ. of Va. Press Digital 
ed. 2018) (1974). 
203. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 193.
204. See id. at 189–90.  In American Legion, Justice Thomas suggested that
because the First Amendment begins “Congress shall make no law,” only the 
legislature is bound by its provisions.  Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 
S. Ct. 2067, 2094–95 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).  This is a startling and
outrageous claim.  In Thomas’ view, then, neither the executive nor the judici-
ary are bound by the First Amendment’s protections against establishments
and for free speech, press, assembly, and free exercise.  Under such a theory,
absent legislation, the president could insist that all executive branch hiring
be Presbyterians or prohibit all federal employees, if they want to keep their
jobs, from publicly (on social media or otherwise) saying anything derogatory
about the president.  The executive could openly agree only to prosecute certain
crimes when committed by political opponents (such as perjury).  The president
could announce that Islam is the official religion of the United States and will
be treated as such by the Executive Branch.  Of course, the courts have con-
sistently rejected this argument, see RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 263 n.2, but
Thomas’ willingness to even float the argument is breathtaking.  (Does this
suggest that he believes the Trump administration¾with his wife being a key
lobbyist on such issues¾could ignore the anti-establishment clause?).
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national day of prayer.205  His views in this regard are worth 
quoting at length: 
I consider the government of the US. as interdicted by the 
constitution from intermedling [sic] with religious 
institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises.  [T]his 
results not only from the provision that no law shall be 
made respecting the establishment, or free exercise, of 
religion, but from that also which reserves to the states the 
powers not delegated to the US.  [C]ertainly[,] no power to 
prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in 
religious discipline, has been delegated to the general 
government.  [I]t must then rest with the states, as far as 
it can be in any human authority.  [B]ut it is only proposed 
that I should recommend, not prescribe a day of fasting 
[and] prayer.  [T]hat is that I should indirectly assume to 
the US. an authority over religious exercises which the 
[C]onstitution has directly precluded them from.  [I]t must
be meant too that this recommendation is to carry some
authority, and to be sanctioned by some penalty on those
who disregard it: not indeed of fine & imprisonment but of
some degree of proscription perhaps in public opinion.
[A]nd does the change in the nature of the penalty make
the recommendation the less a law of conduct for those to
whom it is directed?  I do not believe it is for the interest of
religion to invite the civil magistrate to direct it’s [sic]
exercises, its discipline or its doctrines: nor of the religious
societies that the General government should be invested
with the power of effecting any uniformity of time or matter
among them.  [F]asting [and] prayer are religious exercises.
[T]he enjoining [of] them an act of discipline, every
religious society has a right to determine for itself the times
for these exercises [and] the objects proper for them
according to their own particular tenets.  [A]nd this right
can never be safer than in their own hands, where the
[C]onstitution has deposited it.206
James Madison, under pressure from Congress during the
national crisis that culminated in the War of 1812, did issue a 
205. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, supra note 161.
206. Id.
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national prayer proclamation, but he later concluded that this was 
an error, a violation of the Constitution.207  Even when issuing the 
proclamation, Madison sought to minimize its impact:  
[F]reed from all coercive edicts, from that unhallowed
connexion [sic] with the powers of this world, which
corrupts religion into an instrument or an usurper of the
policy of the state, and, making no appeal but to reason, to
the heart and to the conscience, can spread its benign
influence everywhere, and can attract to the Divine Altar
those free-will offerings of humble supplication,
thanksgiving and praise, which alone can be acceptable to
Him whom no hypocrisy can deceive, and no forced
sacrifices propitiate.208
Yet, while Jefferson was emphatic that if the president made 
an official prayer proclamation it violated the Constitution, in both 
of his inaugural addresses, Jefferson prayed.  In the second 
inaugural address, he supplicated: 
I shall need too the favour of that being in whose hands we 
are: who led our fathers, as Israel of old, from their native 
land; and planted them in a country flowing with all the 
necessaries & comforts of life; who has covered our infancy 
with his providence, & our riper years with his wisdom & 
power: & to whose goodness I ask you to join in 
supplications with me, that he will so enlighten the minds 
of your servants, guide their councils, & prosper their 
measures, that whatsoever they do shall result in your 
good, & shall secure to you the peace, friendship, & 
approbation of all nations.209 
In his first, he also prayed publicly: “And may that infinite power, 
which rules the destinies of the universe, lead our councils to what 
is best, and give them a favorable issue for your peace and 
207. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 190–91.
208. James Madison, Presidential Proclamation (July 23, 1813), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/03-06-02-0434 
[https://perma.cc/MS8M-XJ82] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
209. Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1805), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-1302 
[https://perma.cc/8L9K-JZXY] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021) (early access). 
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prosperity.”210  Some critics have concluded that Jefferson was 
simply being inconsistent.  Daniel Dreisbach, for example, says that 
these two situations were “virtually indistinguishable.”211 
Jefferson obviously did not see it as such.212 
There is a simple but powerful point that Jefferson was 
showing in his actions: under the First Amendment, an official can 
pray, even publicly, but he or she cannot pray officially.  Justice 
Stevens made the point in his Van Orden dissent: “when public 
officials deliver public speeches, we recognize that their words are 
not exclusively a transmission from the government because those 
oratories have embedded within them the inherently personal 
views of the speaker as an individual member of the polity.”213  
Imagine a president leaving the White House on a Sunday 
morning and telling a scrum of reporters stationed there that he is 
on his way to church.  This is very different from the president 
approaching the cameras and microphones, surrounded by cabinet 
officials, and saying it is time for all Americans to get up and go to 
church accompanied by a proclamation on official letterhead to the 
same effect.  While undoubtedly there will be instances where it 
might be difficult to discern on what side of that line an official’s 
actions land, the concept was very clear to Jefferson. 
The same issues were at work when Jefferson, as president, 
attended church services held in the House of Representatives. 
Those services, when the House was not otherwise in use, were not 
based on a joint resolution of Congress nor official in any manner 
as some have argued.214  In fact, with very few finished buildings 
210. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-33-02-0116-
0004 [perma.cc/6VH8-WY3P] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
211. DREISBACH, supra note 100, at 57.
212. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 191–92.
213. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 723 (2005) (Stevdreens, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis original). 
214. See, e.g., 1 CHRIS RODDA, LIARS FOR JESUS: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT’S 
ALTERNATE VERSION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 443–47 (2006).  The situation was 
not unlike the use of schools for church services on Sunday morning when not 
otherwise in use.  For an interesting take on this practice, see Bronx Household 
of Faith v. Board of Education of New York, 750 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(accepting public buildings can be restricted in use for worship but not by reli-
gious groups generally).  See also RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 193–98 (Jefferson 
effectively prevented worship on the grounds at the University of Virginia 
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in the young Washington D.C., the House was often used for 
various, religious and non-religious, functions.215 
Jefferson had made a similar point as a young man, noting that 
a church receives no special privileges simply because an official is 
a member:  
[E]ach church being free, no one can have jurisdiction over
another; no not even when the civil magistrate joins it.  [I]t
neither acquires the right of the sword by the magistrate’s
coming to it, nor does it lose the rights of instruction or
excommunication by his going from it.  [I]t cannot by the
accession of any new member acquire jurisdiction over
those who do not accede.  [H]e brings only himself, having
no power to bring others.216
In his Detached Memoranda, written after he left the White 
House, Madison took on the same problem.  He explained that “[i]n 
their individual capacities, as distinct from their official station, 
[officials] might unite in recommendations of any sort whatever; in 
the same manner as any other individuals might do.  But then their 
recommendations o{ught?} to express the true character from which 
they emanate.”217 
Jeffersonians in the early republic recognized the distinction. 
St. George Tucker, in his View of the Constitution, explained the 
position of officials, thus: “They cannot, as public men, give 
[religion] any other assistance [than example].  All, besides, that 
during his lifetime but accepted impartially drawn access for religious activi-
ties in public facilities as a workable compromise). 
215. RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 196–97.  After his retirement from the pres-
idency, Jefferson would often attend church services in the Charlottesville 
Courthouse where, lacking downtown churches, ministers from different de-
nominations rotated who would lead the Sunday service (Baptist, Episcopal, 
Methodist, Presbyterian).  See Charlottesville and Albemarle County Court-
house Historic District, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/jour-
ney/cha.htm [perma.cc/T4VN-2MVU] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).  When the 
effort to build a nonsectarian church failed and several of the ministers decided 
that they needed their own churches, Jefferson agreed to contribute (although 
family ties and tradition still weighed on the former president: He gave $200 
to build an Episcopal Church, $60 for a Presbyterian, and $20 for a Baptist). 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 2 JEFFERSON’S MEMORANDUM BOOKS: ACCOUNTS, WITH
LEGAL RECORDS AND MISCELLANY, 1767–1826, 1403 (James A. Bear, Jr., & Lu-
cia C. Stanton eds., 2d ser., 2017). 
216. Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, supra note 92.
217. See Detached Memoranda, supra note 179.
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has been called a public leading in religion, has done it an essential 
injury, and produced some of the worst consequences.”218  
Newspaper commentators took up the same refrain, writing that 
Jefferson was “disclaiming a right to intermeddle with religion in 
his capacity as chief magistrate.”219  Another was even more clear, 
distinguishing between a “civil ruler, clothed with temporal power” 
from action by the same official “in his private capacity, as a 
man.”220  “Mr. Jefferson, in his political capacity, lets [religion] 
alone . . . is not inclined to intervene with his power,” but privately 
“attends public worship.”221  Modern commentators have noted the 
difference between public performance and public official 
performance, as have political scientists.222  It is worth noting that 
Washington’s Farewell Address also joined this question, with 
Washington emphasizing that it was not an “official” declaration, 
rather, the “disinterested warnings of a parting friend.”223 
Once again, undoubtedly there will be cases in which it may be 
difficult to draw this line, but that does not mean that the point is 
invalid.  If anything, it means that additional care should be taken 
by officials to ensure that they are not using their official position 
to promote religion. 
Importantly, the principle is not limited to religious exercise; 
this same principle was and is at work in the government in other 
ways, strengthening the argument for applying it in this context. 
For example, Jefferson was also concerned with the question of 
whether government officials could, as officials, engage in political 
activity.  Jefferson’s Secretary of Treasury, Albert Gallatin, 
proposed a circular letter to customs officers (the most numerous 
218. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 
WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 373 (Liberty Fund 1999) (1803) (quoting RICHARD
PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 35–36 (1785) (emphasis 
original)).   
219. See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 192 (quoting BRIDGEPORT REPUBLICAN 
FARMER (Conn.), Oct. 2, 1805). 
220. John A. Ragosta, A Religious Republican and a Republican Religion,
in JEFFERSONIANS IN POWER: IDEAS IN PRACTICE 59, 62 (Joanne B. Freeman & 
Johann M. Neem eds., 2019) (quoting THE WITNESS (Litchfield, Conn.), Oct. 2, 
1805). 
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Martin Marty, Getting Beyond “The Myth of Christian Amer-
ica,” in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, supra note 17, at 364–65. 
223. Washington’s Farewell Address, supra note 22.
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public officials at the time) clarifying this issue and shared a draft 
with Jefferson.224  Gallatin wrote:  
[W]hilst freedom of opinion, & freedom of suffrage at public
elections are considered by the President, as
imprescriptible [sic] rights, which, possessing as citizens,
you cannot have lost by becoming public officers; he will
regard any exercise of official influence to restrain or
controul [sic] the same rights in others as injurious to that
part of the public administration which is confided to your
care, and practically destructive of the fundamental
principles of a republican Constitution.225
Jefferson agreed: “I approve . . .  entirely of the two paragraphs on 
the participation of office, [and] electioneering activity.”226  This 
distinction is still observed in key respects today.  With respect to 
political activity, the Hatch Act prohibits political activity by 
federal officials when acting in an official capacity.227  
A close parallel exists in regard to the right of service men and 
women to engage in political activity.  As with Gallatin’s customs 
letter, regulations recognize that members of the military can 
participate in political activity, but they must not use their military 
position to do so.228  Thus, they are prohibited from wearing 
military uniforms when participating in a political activity, e.g., 
attending a political rally.229  The same constraint should be 
224. See Albert Gallatin, Enclosure: Circular to Customs Collectors (July
20, 1801), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jeffer-
son/01-34-02-0486-0002 [perma.cc/2NKH-FRFF] (last visited Feb 19, 2021). 
225. Id.
226. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (July 26, 1801), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-34-02-0495 
[https://perma.cc/5NEZ-EJAT] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
227. See generally The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7321–7328.  Unfortunately,
this law was wantonly ignored by the Trump Administration and should have 
been enforced.  See, e.g., Zach Montague, What is the Hatch Act? Is Trump Vi-
olating It at the R.N.C.?, N. Y. TIMES  (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.ny-
times.com/2020/08/26/us/politics/hatch-act-trump-rnc.html 
[https://perma.cc/88V8-ESXV]. 
228. See generally DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 1344.10, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY 
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES (2008), https://www.fvap.gov/up-
loads/FVAP/Policies/doddirective134410.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ7S-57RL] 
[hereinafter DOD Directive].  
229. See id § 4.1.4.  Similar restrictions apply in commercial settings to pre-
vent a “military endorsement” of a product.  See id.  Unfortunately, there is a 
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imposed on service chaplains when not directly officiating 
voluntary religious services.  
In the end, government officials may (or may not) be religious, 
and their official positions in no way require that they cease being 
religious or hide their religiosity (or, certainly, that they behave in 
an areligious manner).  Given that fact, it is a canard to argue that 
separation means that officials cannot or will not behave in a moral 
manner based upon their personal religious views.  Nor is it 
accurate to argue that a strict separation will undermine the 
morality of the nation.  Jefferson certainly understood this and 
expected his officials to behave in a virtuous and moral manner.  In 
another relevant context, for example (as noted above), he wrote to 
Gallatin specifically of government obligations to morality: “The 
laws of humanity make it a duty for nations, as well as individuals, 
to succor those who accident and distress have thrown upon 
them.”230  For officials, in terms of their personal beliefs and 
actions, as Seidel explains, “[r]eligiosity is irrelevant; religious 
people fulfill government roles and offices all the time without 
abusing those offices to promote or impose their personal 
religion.”231  At the turn of the twentieth century, a North Carolina 
court made the point like this:  
The beautiful and divine precepts of the Nazarene do 
influence the conduct of our people and individuals, and are 
felt in legislation and in every department of activity.  They 
profoundly impress and shape our civilization.  But it is by 
this influence that it acts, and not because it is a part of the 
organic law, which expressly denies religion any place in 
the supervision or control of secular affairs.232  
Thus, one can distinguish the National Prayer Breakfast, a 
private but public event that political officials often attend, from 
similar tendency in the Trump Administration to ignore these restrictions, and 
on occasion, by Democrats as well.  See Montague, supra note 227.  These reg-
ulations should be enforced.  The services should also prohibit service members 
from wearing uniforms at church services (unless doing so on base or when 
necessity requires). 
230. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (January 24, 1807),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-
4939 [perma.cc/9WHM-9NEG] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
231. Seidel, supra note 43, at 267.
232. See, e.g., Rodman v. Robinson, 47 S.E. 19, 21 (N.C. 1904).
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the National Day of Prayer, an inappropriate proclamation from 
Congress. 
The significance of this point goes beyond the fact that officials 
should feel no constraints in exercising their personal religion. 
Rather, it goes to the angst that seems to motivate many of those 
who are concerned with a separation of church and state.  As 
Jefferson explained to one friend, the claim that he desired 
“government without religion” was a “slander.”233 
C. Government and the Problem of Coercion
Since government officials do not abandon their religiosity
when they join the government, and since the government can 
engage in ceremonial deism234 and can accommodate individuals’ 
religious interests in the “joints” between the Establishment and 
Free Exercise clauses, it begs the question of whether government 
action, to violate the Establishment Clause, must be coercive of an 
individual’s beliefs.  Or, perhaps, the question is better put: how 
coercive must government action be to violate the proscription? 
 The Supreme Court has spoken in very broad terms about the 
limitations placed on government action by the First Amendment.  
The “First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between 
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”235  
“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government 
can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”236  Courts 
“further agree that the state should neither be able to select a 
preferred religion (or religions) nor provide financial or political aid 
to some religions while excluding others.”237  Sometimes the 
language used can add unnecessary angst: that the Constitution 
protects “nonreligion,” Arlin Adams and Charles Emmerich 
233. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to DeWitt Clinton, supra note 37.
234. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989).
235. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citing Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
236. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
237. Gunn, supra note 41, at 18–19.
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explain, can “more properly [be] understood as connoting the right 
of an individual to believe or not to believe in religious matters.”238 
Within these broad parameters, the question of coercion has 
become increasingly a topic of argument among commentators and 
before the courts.239  Of course, the most immediate question is 
what is meant by coercion in this context.  Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Gorsuch have argued that what is required for an 
establishment clause violation is an active government penalty 
(financial or corporal) or benefit given to religion.240  
The breadth of the Scalia/Thomas/Gorsuch argument is 
breathtaking.  If an actual fine or penalty is required, Congress 
could declare the United States a Christian nation (or Muslim or 
Jewish or Buddhist), as could states or localities.  A large cross (or 
Jewish star or Muslim star and crescent) could be erected on the 
top of the White House, Congress, and other government 
buildings¾a result that, thankfully, the majority of the Court 
238. ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSES 
70 (1990). 
239. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Estab-
lishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 936–41 (1986); Michael W. McConnell, 
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part 1: Establishment of 
Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131–81 (2003). 
240. See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2096
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At the founding, ‘[t]he coercion that was a 
hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious or-
thodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.’” (quot-
ing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
removed))); see also Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2263–
64 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (same).  Thomas and Gorsuch also question 
the application of the anti-establishment clause to the states based upon a too 
narrow view of incorporation.  See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 170–80.  Their 
broad attack on the principle of separation of church and state in Espinoza is 
based in large part on the argument that many people who supported separa-
tion did so based upon anti-Catholic animus in the mid-nineteenth century. 
See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2266.  While it is true that there was anti-Catholic 
animus at work in church-state issues in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, Thomas (and now Gorsuch) continue to ignore the fact that the American 
principle of separation long predated the circumstances they cite and was not 
based upon such animus.  See RAGOSTA, supra note 1, at 165–67.  Eighteenth-
century evangelical Baptists and Presbyterians, for example, demanded a 
strict separation of church and state, as did Thomas Jefferson and James Mad-
ison and their supporters, based upon philosophical, political, and theological 
reasons having nothing to do with anti-Catholic animus.  See supra Part II. 
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continues expressly to eschew.241  The president could issue formal 
executive orders and declarations urging everyone to attend a 
particular church, to make a particular prayer, or to support one 
particular religion.  It would not even be clear that government 
financing of religion would be actionable under this view, as it is 
not clear that the taxpayer-plaintiff would have faced, in their 
narrow interpretation, “coercion.” 
Of course, it is true, as these justices point out, that such 
positive coercion would have been considered an establishment in 
the early American nation.  And, as Lupu and Tuttle explained, 
“[t]he founding generation was highly aware of the horrendous 
history of religious coercion, so it’s hardly a surprise that the 
Founders were primarily concerned with eliminating that 
coercion.”242  But the fact that financial and penal coercion in the 
context of religion is impermissible does not excuse other actions. 
Such active, explicit coercion is a sufficient, but not a necessary 
condition.  The early understanding of establishment was not so 
limited. 
The most telling Jeffersonian discussion on this point is the 
1808 letter from Jefferson to the Reverend Samuel Miller quoted at 
length above.243  Jefferson expressly rejects the idea that for a 
government edict to violate the Establishment Clause the 
government must impose “some penalty on those who disregard it 
. . . of fine [and] imprisonment.”244  Rather, Jefferson recognizes 
that the First Amendment is intended to prevent the government 
from “taking sides” in matters of religion.245  Thus, a proclamation 
241. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2106 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[I]f Jus-
tice GORSUCH is right, three Members of the Court were out of line when they 
recognized that ‘[t]he [Establishment] Clause forbids a city to permit the per-
manent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall.’” (citing Salazar 
v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715 (2010)).  See generally County of Allegeny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 606–07 (1989).
242. LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 142.  Lupu and Tuttle also provide
an excellent discussion of the apparent contradictions in the four-justice dis-
sent in County of Allegheny that rejected the relevance of the fact that govern-
ment action made some citizens feel like outsiders while agreeing that a county 
could not erect a large cross on the top of a government building.  See id. at 
150–51. 
243. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, supra note 161; see
supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. 
244. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, supra note 161.
245. Id.
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favoring religion wholly lacking in material penalty could still 
violate the Constitution by imposing “some degree of proscription 
perhaps in public opinion.”246  Jefferson concludes that such 
stigmatization resulting from a government edict does not “make 
the recommendation the less a law of conduct for those to whom it 
is directed.”247  In other words, if the government action divides the 
people by effectively taking a position that those who support some 
religion, or prayer, or religious observance, or religion generally, 
are superior, more patriotic, better citizens, it has violated the 
Constitution’s proscription.  In essence, Jefferson was saying that 
any “coercion” need be only psychological; it exists when the 
246. Id.
247. See id.  This concern with encouraging division among the American
people along religious lines has long been a part of First Amendment jurispru-
dence.  Justices across the spectrum of the Court made this point in American 
Legion.  Gorsuch and Thomas referred to “religiously based divisiveness that 
the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”  Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 
139 S. Ct. 2067, 2103 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)).  Justices Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor discussed the point at length:  
When the government places its “power, prestige [or] financial sup-
port . . . behind a particular religious belief,’ the government’s impri-
matur ‘mak[es] adherence to [that] religion relevant . . . to a person’s 
standing in the political community’ . . . .  [T]he indirect coercive pres-
sure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially 
approved religion is plain. 
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2105 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989)).  The Establishment Clause is 
meant to ensure that “however . . . individuals worship, they will count as full 
and equal American citizens.”  Id. at 2113 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 
572 U.S. 565, 615 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting)).  Justice O’Connor referred to 
the danger when government acts on religion so that a minority is made to feel 
like “outsiders, not full members of the political community.”  County of Alle-
gheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).  As Justice 
O’Connor explained:  
At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences of 
the assumption of religious authority by government, Americans may 
count themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional boundaries 
has protected us from similar travails, while allowing private religious 
exercise to flourish. . . .  Those who would renegotiate the boundaries 
between church and state must therefore answer a difficult question: 
Why would we trade a system that has served us so well for one that 
has served others so poorly?  
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring); see also LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 246. 
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government backs a particular religion or religion generally (or 
irreligion).248 
In Madison’s Detached Memoranda, in rejecting prayer 
proclamations in spite of the claim that they were materially non-
coercive, he emphasized that “An advisory Gov[ernmen]t is a 
contradiction in terms.”249  Later, in seeking to explain his own 
proclamations made under pressure, Madison used language that 
seemed more equivocal on this point.  In writing to Edward 
Livingston in 1822, the former president began by again 
denouncing legislative chaplains and national prayer 
proclamations, but qualified the latter with “so far at least as they 
have spoken the language of injunction, or have lost sight of the 
equality of all Religious Sects in the eye of the Constitution.”250  
Madison continued: 
Whilst I was honored with the Executive Trust, I found it 
necessary on more than one occasion to follow the example 
of predecessors.  But I was always careful to make the 
Proclamations absolutely indiscriminate, and merely 
recommendatory; or rather mere designations of a day, on 
which all who thought proper might unite in consecrating 
it to religious purposes, according to their own faith & 
forms.  In this sense, I presume, you reserve to the 
Government a right to appoint particular days for religious 
worship throughout the State; without any particular 
sanction enforcing the worship.251 
Several years earlier, however, while noting that proclamations 
were “recommendations only,” he still insisted that they were 
beyond the authority of the government: 
  Religious proclamations by the Executive recommending 
thanksgivings [and] fasts are shoots from the same root 
with the legislative acts [chaplains] reviewed.  
248.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, supra note 161.
249. See Detached Memoranda, supra note 179 (emphasis original).
250. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 163 (em-
phasis original). 
251. Id. (emphasis original).
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  Altho[ugh] recommendations only, they imply a religious 
agency, making no part of the trust delegated to political 
rulers. 
  The objections to them are . . . that Gov[ernmen]ts ought 
not to interpose in relation to those subject to their authority 
but in cases where they can do it with effect.  An advisory 
Gov[ernmen]t is a contradiction in terms . . . .  The 
members of a Gov[ernmen]t as such can in no sense, be 
regarded as possessing an advisory trust from their 
Constituents in their religious capacities . . . .  They see{m} 
{to} imply and certainly nourish the erronious [sic] idea of 
a national religion.  Th{is} idea just as it related to the 
Jewish nation under a theocracy, having been improperly 
a{d}opted by so many nations which have embraced 
[Christia]nity, is too apt to lurk {in?} the bosoms even of 
Americans, who in general are aware of the disti{nction} 
between religious & political societies . . . .  [T]he last & not 
the least Objection is the liability of the practice, to 
subserviency to political views; to the scandal of religion, 
as well as the increase of party animosities.252 
Overall, Madison’s view seems to parallel closely Jefferson’s 
conclusion that any requisite coercion need only be implicit, the 
impact of government “choosing” a religion or religion generally.253 
Significantly, the eighteenth-century evangelicals who played 
a critical role in the adoption of a Jeffersonian separation also 
recognized that even a government endorsement was unfairly 
coercive of the personal free will belief that God desired.  John 
Leland, the great Baptist preacher, explained that receiving 
government “indulgence, preferment, or even protection” was a 
form of idolatry by acknowledging a power not of the church.254  
Using language not unlike Jefferson’s later admonition, Leland 
made clear that government lacked the power to discourage a 
person based on religious belief.  “[N]or do the legitimate powers of 
civil government extend so far as to disable, incapacitate, proscribe, 
or in any way distress in person, property, liberty or life, any man 
252. See Detached Memoranda, supra note 179 (emphasis original).
253. See Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 163.
254. LELAND, supra note 22, at 106 n*.
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who cannot believe and practice in the common road.”255  Baptists 
from Buckingham County opposed even legislative incorporation of 
churches, insisting that government needed simply to leave religion 
alone as “the only way to convince the gazing world, that Disciples 
do not follow Christ for Loaves, and that Preachers do not preach 
for Benefices.”256  Government endorsement was neither sought nor 
appropriate, a broad group of religionists from Amherst County 
wrote in 1779, noting that they were “Fully Persuaded . . . .  That 
the Religion of [Jesus Christ] may and ought to be Committed to 
the Protection Guidance and Blessing of its Divine Author and 
needs not the Interposition of any Human Power for its 
Establishment [and] Support.”257 
When the government uses its authority to suggest that good 
and patriotic Americans should endorse a particular religious view 
or event, from a Jeffersonian perspective, and with a goal of 
minimizing religious conflict, this is enough coercion to doom the 
action constitutionally.  This is not unlike the prohibition on 
members of the military wearing uniforms to political rallies, giving 
the erroneous, but implicitly coercive, impression that the military 
has endorsed a particular political candidate. 
Other scholars have made similar observations noting the 
implicit penalty of not conforming to a government “choice” in this 
area.  For example, discussing the Continental Congress’ uses of 
days of fasting and prayer during the Revolution, Derek Davis notes 
“[t]hose who failed to observe the fasts were frowned upon by the 
faithful and often suspected of disloyalty to American interests.”258  
While it was argued in American Humanist that there was no 
evidence that over the 100 years the Bladensburg Cross was 
standing that minorities had been discouraged from objecting 
because of the apparent government endorsement,259 this tends to 
255. Id. at 108.
256. H. J. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA 119 
(1910) (quoting Petition from the Inhabitants of Buckingham County to the 
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 1, 1786)). 
257. Petition from the Inhabitants of Amherst County to the House of Del-
egates of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Nov. 1, 1779), http://www.vir-
giniamemory.com/collections/petitions [perma.cc/7SKZ-M29V]. 
258. Davis, supra note 100, at 186. 
259. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2091 (2019)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that “nothing in the record suggests that the 
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ignore the nature of such implicit coercion.  It is also likely to 
encourage future litigants to look for such evidence and present it 
in the form of a “Brandeis brief,” further entangling the courts in 
unnecessary and disruptive factual inquiries concerning religion 
and implicit coercion.260 
More recently, the Court gave important guidance on the issue 
of religious coercion in the context of exempting religious 
organizations from employment regulation.  In Our Lady of 
Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the Court noted that the 
First Amendment protects the right of religious organizations to 
decide matters of faith and that “[s]tate interference in that sphere 
would obviously violate the free exercise of religion, and any 
attempt by government to dictate or even to influence such matters 
would constitute one of the central attributes of an establishment 
of religion.”261  In this Free Exercise context, the Court rejected any 
government attempt “even to influence” such matters.262  This is an 
excellent statement of the Jeffersonian principle and certainly any 
effort by the government to endorse religion would be an attempt 
“to influence” such matters and should properly be understood as 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.  A financial or physical 
penalty is not required in spite of Justices Thomas, Scalia, and 
Gorsuch’s efforts to breach the wall of separation. 
Significantly, the Court has been particularly solicitous of any 
coercive force imposed on children, particularly in the context of 
schools.  For example, in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy 
lack of public outcry ‘was due to a climate of intimidation.’” (quoting Van Orden 
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment))).
260. See John Ragosta, Paul Finkelman & Steven K. Green, Town prayers:




261. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060
(2020); compare County of Alleghany v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (“plac[ing] the government’s weight behind an obvious ef-
fort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion” violates the Establishment 
Clause), with Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2256 (2020) 
(“The Free Exercise Clause protects against even ‘indirect coercion,’ and a 
State ‘punishe[s] the free exercise of religion’ by disqualifying the religious 
from government aid as Montana did here.”   (quoting Trinity Lutheran Church 
of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2017) (alteration original))). 
262. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2060.
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recognized the problem: “The sole question presented is whether a 
religious exercise may be conducted at a graduation ceremony in 
circumstances where, as we have found, young graduates who 
object are induced to conform.”263  While it is appropriate for the 
Court to be particularly concerned with coercion of minors¾as was 
Jefferson, for example in his argument that Bibles should not be 
used in the schooling of young children264¾the same concerns, at 
least in principle, apply to all citizens.  If the “material coercion” 
test was adopted, it would seriously undermine the argument for a 
more solicitous protection of children in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
It is worth discussing an alternative approach to the First 
Amendment religion clauses that, to some extent, avoids questions 
of coercion.  In Secular Government, Religious People, Lupu and 
Tuttle suggest that the focus should be on government rather than 
individuals who might (or might not) be coerced; after all, the First 
Amendment is fundamentally a restriction on government 
power.265  This was certainly a point made in the early debates over 
separation.  John Leland explained that “[g]overnment has no more 
to do with the religious opinions of men, than it has with the 
263. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).  The Court has distin-
guished government sponsored prayer for adults (although the Court’s flippant 
conclusion that adults are “not readily susceptible . . . to peer pressure” is 
highly suspect):  
This case can be distinguished from the conclusions and holding of Lee 
v. Weisman . . . .  There the Court found that, in the context of a grad-
uation where school authorities maintained close supervision over the 
conduct of the students and the substance of the ceremony, a religious 
invocation was coercive as to an objecting student. . . .  Neither choice 
represents an unconstitutional imposition as to mature adults who 
“presumably” are “not readily susceptible to religious indoctrination, 
or peer pressure.” 
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)); cf. Doe v. Indian River Sch. 
Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 264–65, 276 (3d Cir. 2011) (Students at school board meet-
ings for presentations “bear several markings of ‘involuntariness’ and the im-
plied coercion that the Court has acknowledged elsewhere.”). 
264. See JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 147 (“Instead therefore of putting the
Bible and Testament into the hands of the children, at an age when their judg-
ments are not sufficiently matured for religious enquiries, their memories may 
here be stored with the most useful facts from Grecian, Roman, European and 
American history.”). 
265. LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 5.
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principles of mathematics.”266  Jefferson was equally clear that one 
should not give government “an authority over religious exercises 
which the constitution has directly precluded them from.”267 
Lupu and Tuttle give Engel v. Vitale as an example of the 
application of their method, arguing that while the lower New York 
court had found no coercion in the prayer, the Supreme Court 
instead focused on the government being engaged in the 
impermissible function of writing a prayer.268  The Court stated 
emphatically that “it is no part of the business of government to 
compose official prayers for any group of the American people to 
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government.”269  
Yet, the Court went on to explain the problem generated by that 
type of government activity: 
 The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to 
stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the 
prestige of the Federal Government would be used to 
control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the 
American people can say— that the people’s religions must 
not be subjected to the pressures of government for change 
each time a new political administration is elected to office 
. . . . 
. . .  The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise 
Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct 
governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment 
of laws which establish an official religion whether those 
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or 
not . . . .  When the power, prestige and financial support of 
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, 
the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to 
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is 
plain.270 
266. LELAND, supra note 86, at 184.
267. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, supra note 161.
268. LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 119–20.
269. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
270. Id. at 429–31 (emphasis added).  The mere posting of Ten Command-
ments in schools would not meet the coercion test (as argued by Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Gorsuch), but be violative under jurisdiction test.  See LUPU & 
TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 126. 
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Two thoughts: First, one of the reasons why government was 
precluded from acting or talking on these topics is that government 
speech is almost always inherently coercive; even if our legal 
analysis should focus more on government action rather than the 
impact on individuals, certainly it is true that we do not want (and 
the First Amendment should be seen to prohibit) government 
coercion in the area of religion. 
Second, some might distinguish in this context government 
action that solicits a response from that which does not.  So, for 
example, it could be argued that a government proclamation of a 
national day of prayer might be seen as inherently coercive whereas 
maintenance of a religious symbol previously placed on public 
ground might not.  This is a potentially useful distinction, but one 
significant problem in the cases dealing with public religious 
monuments is failure to consider adequately the active expenditure 
of funds to maintain the monuments.271 
D. Religious Exemptions
Since the founding of the United States, people have sought to
have their otherwise illegal activities excused based upon an 
alleged religious justification.  Since adoption of the poorly named 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993,272 people are 
increasingly claiming that their religious freedom gives them a 
right to ignore laws with which they do not agree.  The idea seeming 
to be that on the “private side” of the wall of separation, religion is 
a license.  Such claims range, for example, from a commercial 
bakery’s refusal to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple,273 to 
271. This issue has been much discussed in the context of Confederate mon-
uments.  See, e.g., Brian Palmer & Seth Freed Wessler, The Costs of the Con-
federacy, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Dec. 2018), https://www.smithson-
ianmag.com/history/costs-confederacy-special-report-180970731/ 
[perma.cc/9Z5U-TMVR]; Steven I. Weiss, You Won’t Believe What the Govern-
ment Spends on Confederate Graves, ATLANTIC (July 19, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/07/government-spending-
confederate-graves/277931/ [https://perma.cc/27CK-3266] (funding, per se, 
might not be found to make a monument an illegal establishment if “neutral” 
funding is applied to existing monuments, but it does increase the problem 
with the maintenance of religious iconography). 
272. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
273. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1723 (2018). 
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refusal to rent a wedding space to an inter-racial couple,274 to 
refusal to provide contraceptive coverage in employee health 
insurance,275 to refusal to abide by sexual-orientation non-
discrimination in foster care.276 
Cases of this type are myriad and excessively complicated 
because of RFRA.  I will not seek to survey the ground on religious 
exemptions here but, rather, will seek to make several historic 
observations.  Jefferson expressly rejected such exemptions from 
“impartial” laws: 
[W]hatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth, or permitted
to the subject in the ordinary way, cannot be forbidden to
him for religious uses; [and] whatsoever is prejudicial to
the commonwealth in their ordinary uses & therefore
prohibited by the laws, ought not to be permitted to
churches in their sacred rites.  [F]or instance it is unlawful
in the ordinary course of things or in a private house to
murder a child.  [I]t should not be permitted any sect then
to sacrifice children: it is ordinarily lawful (or temporally
lawful) to kill calves or lambs.  [T]hey may therefore be
religiously sacrificed, but if the good of the state required a
temporary suspension of killing lambs (as during a siege)
sacrifices of them may then be rightfully suspended also.
[T]his is the true extent of toleration.277
Jefferson made this point again in the preamble to the Statute for 
Establishing Religious Freedom: While “the opinions of men are not 
the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction,” 
government can intervene when religious “principles break out into 
overt acts against peace and good order.”278  He repeated the point 
in discussions with Madison about a possible Bill of Rights: “[t]he 
274. Allyson Chiu, A Mississippi wedding venue rejected an interracial cou-
ple, citing ‘Christian belief.’ Facing a backlash, the owner apologized., WASH. 
POST (Sept. 3, 2019, 7:04 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/
2019/09/03/mississippi-wedding-venue-rejects-interracial-couple-christian-be-
lief-apologized/ [https://perma.cc/XTE2-DLFJ]. 
275. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
276. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F. 3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (19-123). 
277. Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, supra note 92.
278. Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 60.
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declaration that religious faith shall be unpunished, does not give 
impunity to criminal acts dictated by religious error.”279 
Madison joined in the argument.  Madison wrote to Edward 
Livingston that he approved of “the immunity of Religion from Civil 
Jurisdiction, in every case where it does not trespass on private 
rights or the public peace.”280  Thomas Cooley, the nineteenth 
century constitutional scholar, agreed: Religious practice is exempt 
from government intrusion “so long as the public order is not 
disturbed.”281  Eighteenth-century evangelicals agreed: “Should a 
man refuse to pay his tribute for the support of government, or any 
wise disturb the peace and good order of the civil police, he should 
be punished according to his crime, let his religion be what it will; 
but when a man is a peaceable subject of state, he should be 
protected in worshipping the Deity according to the dictates of his 
own conscience.”282  Of course, laws always addressed 
circumstances (such as commercial discrimination) when actions 
tread on “the public peace.” 
The Supreme Court’s first religious freedom case also 
emphatically rejected the doctrine of a religious exemption: “To 
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious 
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every 
citizen to become a law unto himself.  Government could exist only 
in name under such circumstances.”283  Modern cases, after some 
hesitation, agreed.284 
The scope of this Jeffersonian approach is not so broad as some 
suggest nor is it an attack on religion.  First, legislation determines 
279. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-13-02-0335 
[perma.cc/77FS-WGFN] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
280. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 163.
281. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
467 (2d ed. 1871). 
282. JOHN LELAND, A YANKEE SPY (1794), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF
ELDER JOHN LELAND, supra note 22, at 213, 228. 
283. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).  When confronted
with the question of religious-based polygamy, the Court recognized that 
“[h]owever free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the 
criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions regarded by gen-
eral consent as properly the subjects of punitive legislation.”  Davis v. Beason, 
133 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1890). 
284. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–82 (1990) (rejecting reli-
gious exemptions for “neutral, generally applicable regulatory laws”). 
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what is a violation of the public order (“peace and good order” to use 
Jefferson’s term).285  Business owners can discriminate on the basis 
of race, sexual orientation, religion, gender, or any other criteria 
until the duly-elected legislature prohibits such discrimination. 
The law itself must fall within the legitimate authority of 
government and must not, itself, violate constitutional 
proscriptions.  To use a term that Jefferson used, it must be 
“impartial regulation” (or what the Court today would say is 
“neutral”).286  Picking up on Jefferson’s example: If the government, 
in time of war, prohibits the slaughtering of lambs so as to 
encourage meat production of sheep, this is a legitimate 
government regulation, and one cannot claim a religious 
285. See Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 60.
286. Jefferson authored the Rockfish Gap Commissioners’ Report that,
when adopted by the Virginia House of Delegates, created the University of 
Virginia.  See Ellen Hickman, Avoiding “The appearance of dictating to the As-
sembly”: Thomas Jefferson and the Establishment of the University of Virginia, 
1818-1819, in THE FOUNDING OF THOMAS JEFFERSON’S UNIVERSITY 95, 95–101 
(John A. Ragosta, et al. eds., 2019).  Jefferson’s initial draft not only excluded 
a professor of divinity, even though such a professorship was the practice at 
other colleges, but it also did not provide for religious services on campus.  See 
Thomas Jefferson, Draft of the Rockfish Gap Report of the University of Vir-
ginia Commissioners, in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT
SERIES 189, 189–202 (J. Jefferson Looney, et al. eds., 2018).  At the meeting of 
the Rockfish Gap commissioners, presumably having been encouraged by other 
commissioners, Jefferson added a clause that a room would be provided for 
“religious worship, under such impartial regulations as the Visitors shall pre-
scribe, for public examinations, for a library.”  See id. at 203 n.22.  Jefferson 
and the UVA Board of Visitors later reaffirmed their commitment to impar-
tiality.  Meeting Minutes of Univ. of Va. Board of Visitors (October 2, 1820), 
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-
1551 [perma.cc/RYP3-ENTD] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).  Jefferson later re-
turned to the need for impartial regulation in an 1825 letter to the University’s 
proctor, Arthur Brockenbrough.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Arthur S. 
Brockenbrough (April 21, 1825), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.
gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-5152 [perma.cc/3TLS-NM6Z] (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2021).  While Jefferson ultimately refused to permit religious services 
on UVA’s campus during his life, see RAGOSTA supra note 1, at 193–98, the 
standard that he proposed is much like the modern Court’s use of “neutrality” 
between religion and non-religion, cf. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 
S. Ct. 2246, 2280 (2020) (“The Free Exercise Clause . . . ‘protects religious ob-
servers against unequal treatment’ and against ‘laws that impose special dis-
abilities on the basis of religious status.’” (quoting Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted))).
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exemption.287  At the same time, the government could not ban 
Jewish people from slaughtering lambs or ban the slaughtering of 
lambs for religious purposes as those would not be “impartial 
regulations.”288  One must be vigilant that laws are neutral before 
any question of religious exemption arises.  The question in the first 
instance is not whether such laws are a good idea or should survive, 
but who should be responsible for crafting such laws and 
limitations.289 
Second, the legislature can create an exception or exemption to 
its own laws that impose requirements that might impinge on 
individual’s religious exercises.  For example, a ban on the use of 
alcohol might exempt sacramental wine, as the law did during 
Prohibition.  Similarly, a law criminalizing the use of peyote might 
readily include an exemption for Native American religious 
practices.  Such exceptions can accommodate, but not endorse, 
religion.  The Court has said that such accommodation evidences 
“play in the joints” between the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses.290  As Lupu and Tuttle explain:  
Whenever the government responds to religious needs as 
part of a broader class of concerns, the government does not 
make those religious needs a matter of its own ends or 
identity.  Instead, it recognizes that many of its people will 
make those concerns a central part of their own life 
projects.291 
As with the legislative proscriptions at issue, such exemptions 
should come from the legislature.292  
287. See Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, supra note 92; supra note 277 and
accompanying text. 
288. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 521 (1993). 
289. Justice Scalia, who authored the opinion in Smith, was in part making
this point.  See Smith, 494 U.S. 872.  Compare Justice Kavanaugh’s plaintive 
plea in American Legion that the courts are not the only protectors of religious 
freedom.  Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2092–94 (2019). 
290. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019.
291. LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 215.
292. The Supreme Court’s most recent cases, however, draw into question
this “play in the joints” between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exer-
cise clause, seeming to require states to always treat religious institutions the 
same as secular institutions.  Cf. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. 
Ct. 2246, 2282 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had previ-
ously “held that there ‘are some state actions permitted by the Establishment 
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Most of the modern cases, however, raise questions under a 
blanket exception or qualification, as in RFRA.  Such laws raise 
broad concerns, in particular unintended consequences. Keep in 
mind that a court cannot question an individual’s claim of religious 
need, for example, the insistence that a baker’s religion prohibits 
her or him from baking a cake is tenuous and would be strongly 
challenged by many theologians, but it is not a court’s responsibility 
to do so.293  
Thus, any individual can object to application of any law based 
upon their own personal religious beliefs and force the government, 
if it wishes to enforce the law, to show that the law either does not 
substantially burden that person’s religion (as they define it) or 
serves a compelling government interest and is crafted as narrowly 
as possible to not infringe on a person’s religious exercise.  As 
Jefferson recognized, the broad and undefined application of these 
exemptions is a prescription for disaster.294  In a “liberal” example, 
people providing relief to undocumented immigrants have 
successfully relied upon RFRA.295  Those supporting polygamy can 
be expected to make similar arguments.  One labor lawyer has 
confided to me his intention to use RFRA to argue that restrictions 
on labor organizing violate his Marxist religion. 
Under RFRA, not only will many practices have to be permitted 
when justified based upon an alleged religious reason, potentially 
creating a patchwork of legal enforcement and limiting the 
solicitous effects of good laws, but an immense amount of court time 
Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.’” (quoting Locke v. Davey, 
540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004))).  While the Court’s decision in Espinoza benefitted 
religious education, the same rationale might be used to claim that any legis-
lative religious exemption is, de facto, an establishment. 
293. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714–15 (1981) (“[I]t is
not for [courts] to say that the line dr[awn]” on a religious belief is “an unrea-
sonable one.” (citation omitted)); see also LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 43, at 200 
(“[T]he long-standing constraint on judicial evaluation of ‘the place of a partic-
ular belief in a religion’ has remained fully intact.” (quoting Hernandez v. Com-
missioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989))).  Cf. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter 
and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2365, 2390–91 (2020) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (although RFRA requires an “honest conviction,” “it is not for 
[courts] to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
294. See Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 60.
295. See Elana Schor, Religious freedom law plays key role in migrant-aid
case, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 29, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/
1c894dedcb744e4f82ad925dbbc8042f [https://perma.cc/W4WM-JZ5E]. 
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will be taken up by issues more properly resolved by a legislature 
or administrative agency.  This type of blanket exception turns 
decisions that should be made by legislatures over to courts.296  
Moreover, with the plethora of cases justifying violations of 
anti-discrimination laws based on religion, the courts will certainly 
face renewed arguments that racial and religious discrimination is 
required by some bigoted plaintiffs’ religion.297  While we can 
anticipate that the courts will find ending racial discrimination a 
compelling state interest, we can expect a host of litigation on 
whether legislation intended to end racial discrimination is 
adequately narrowly tailored.  Similar arguments will arise in cases 
involving discrimination against Jews, Mormons, Muslims, and 
other religious minorities.  Discrimination based on gender, gender-
orientation, age, national origin, etc., will likely face similar tests.  
CONCLUSION 
A fundamental point, worth repeating, is that a strict 
separation of church and state, in a Jeffersonian voice, is not 
inconsistent with a vibrant private religion on the “other” side of 
the wall.  Indeed, history demonstrates that it encourages it. 
Nor does a separation undermine the morality and virtue of 
government or its citizens.  Nor do government officials have to 
“check” their religiosity at the door of government service, although 
they are precluded from using their government position to promote 
religion. 
A renewed commitment to a Jeffersonian separation of church 
and state would result in citizens, courts, and legislatures 
recognizing that government efforts to influence religion, even to 
296. See John Ragosta, We can celebrate religious freedom by keeping reli-
gion separate from government, DALL. MORNING NEWS, (Jan. 16, 2020, 2:00 
AM), https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/01/16/we-can-
celebrate-religious-freedom-by-keeping-religion-separate-from-government/ 
[https://perma.cc/5F7X-CN7V].  In addition, judicial activism on Free Exercise 
is a strange position to be championed by conservatives who claim to favor ju-
dicial restraint. 
297. For example, a new, “whites only” church has opened in Minnesota,
the Asatru Folk Assembly.  John Reinan, Minnesota town votes to allow white 
supremacist church, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.startribune.
com/tiny-minnesota-town-to-vote-today-on-allowing-white-supremacist-
church/573344361/ [https://perma.cc/Q3AE-V6RD].  Claims of a religious basis 
for racial discrimination will almost certainly proliferate under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act due to the recent trends in Supreme Court cases. 
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encourage it generally, serve only to tarnish it, corrupt government, 
and recklessly divide the American people. 
